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INTRODUCTION 
The debate over parity—the relative competence of state and federal 
courts, particularly in the enforcement of federal constitutional rights—
has a long pedigree.  It began in 1787, at the Constitutional Convention 
in Philadelphia.1  Most everyone agreed on the establishment of a single 
supreme court to give voice to a uniform body of federal law.2  But views 
differed about the lower federal courts.  Some, like James Madison, 
wanted to mandate such courts.3  Others, like Roger Sherman, thought the 
state courts could handle federal business first.4  Eventually, the delegates 
punted and left it up to Congress to allocate judicial power.5 
Some two hundred years later, in 1977, Professor Burt Neuborne 
ignited the contemporary parity debate by making a detailed criticism of 
the competence of state courts as frontline enforcers of federal rights, 
animated by his own experience as a civil rights litigator.6  Neuborne 
believed that, in suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce federal 
rights, civil rights litigants were much more likely to secure effective 
 
 1. See THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 2. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. 
 3. Resolutions Proposed by Mr. Randolph in Convention May 29, 1787, in NOTES OF DEBATES 
IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION REPORTED BY JAMES MADISON 32 (1987). 
 4. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 1:125. 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 6. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).  The parity debate was 
prefigured by earlier waves of legal discourse grappling with much the same comparative problematics.  
From approximately the 1920s through the 1960s, calls to abolish diversity jurisdiction argued that state 
courts should be trusted to treat outsiders fairly; that state courts were better able to interpret their own 
laws; and states, as sovereigns within our federal system, deserved the respect of noninterference from 
the federal courts.  See Henry Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 
483 (1927); George Cochran Doub, Time for Re-evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity Jurisdiction?, 
44 A.B.A. J. 243 (1958); see also Robert J. Sheran & Barbara Isaacman, State Cases Belong in State 
Courts, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1 (1978); Leslie A. Anderson, The Line Between Federal and State Court 
Jurisdiction, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1203 (1965).  And scholars, practitioners, and judges were nearly uniform 
in their insistence that the federal courts were overburdened with newly-created federal statutory rights 
(e.g., those stemming from the Jones Act) and had to let go of other types of claims in exchange.  Diversity 
seemed like the logical choice.  See Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United 
States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499 (1928). See, e.g., Howard C. Bratton, Diversity 
Jurisdiction—An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 51 IND. L.J. 347 (1976); David L. Shapiro, Federal 
Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1977). 
  Similarly, the parity debate of the 1970s–1990s took place against a backdrop of anxiety about 
the federal courts’ workload.  See, e.g., Henry Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 
59 CORNELL L. REV. 634, 643 (1974); Tom C. Clark, A Commentary on Congestion in the Federal Courts, 
8 ST. MARY’S L.J. 407 (1976).  Such debates are rooted in the design of our federal system itself—after 
all, the framers provided for diversity jurisdiction precisely because they contemplated the possibility of 
state-court prejudice.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 82 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Herbert Wechsler, 
Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 239–40 
(1948).  Neuborne’s article broke new ground, but draws upon longstanding allocational tensions. 
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relief in federal court.7   
But Neuborne offered more than a how-to guide for litigants. He 
exposed what he viewed as the U.S. Supreme Court’s assumption that 
state and federal courts were in parity as it decided questions about the 
allocation of judicial power between state and federal courts.8  In the 
course of doing so, Neuborne gestured at a number of institutional 
parameters that could, in theory, be measured empirically to provide a 
positive answer to the parity question. 
Neuborne’s work on parity struck a nerve.  Some scholars endorsed the 
possibility of empiricism as a means of allocating cases between state and 
federal court; others rejected this position, invoking methodological and 
normative concerns.  Professor Akhil Amar argued that the framers of 
Article III had already resolved the parity debate. Amar’s influential two-
tier thesis would require federal judges to handle federal question claims 
in either the first or last instance.9   
Professor Martin Redish offered another view, arguing instead that 
Congress bears primary allocational responsibility.10  Anticipating current 
dissatisfaction with the U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrines of prudential 
abstention, Redish argued for judicial deference to the jurisdictional 
statutes that govern access to federal court.11  Paradoxically, his critique 
was based in part on the contention that a satisfactory answer to the parity 
question required empirical evidence, but that such evidence was 
methodologically impossible to procure.  Therefore, Redish argued that 
scholars should drop the parity question altogether.12  Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky offered a simpler method, framing issues of parity in terms 
of litigants’ forum selection; he was content to sidestep the empirical 
question and trust the lawyers.13 
Indeed, a striking feature of parity scholarship has been its tendency to 
proclaim the parity debate at an end.14  In the past two decades, the parity 
debate has gone dormant, and the few articles that do call for its revival 
 
 7. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1115. 
 8. Id. at 1130–31. 
 9. Akhil Reed Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, 71 B.U. L. REV. 645 (1991); Akhil 
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 
65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985). 
 10. Martin Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory: A Comment on 
Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REV. 329 (1988). 
 11. Id. at 343–45. 
 12. Id. at 330. 
 13. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 
36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 604–
06 (1991). 
 14. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 259; Chemerinsky, Ending the 
Parity Debate, supra note 13.  
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have gone largely unheeded.15  Even Neuborne recanted, acknowledging 
that changes in the identity of the judges staffing state and federal courts 
may alter forum preference for the enforcement of civil rights claims.16 
Just as parity was disappearing from law reviews, empiricists began 
developing and applying more sophisticated modeling techniques to 
assess the institutional parameters identified by Neuborne and others. 
These methods evaluate a surprisingly broad range of judicial behaviors 
and characteristics of state and federal court systems.  Although it does 
not self-consciously attempt to extend the parity debate, the new 
scholarship on parity offers evidence called for by earlier writers. 
Building on the new empiricism, this Article urges a reframing of the 
parity debate.  Rather than focusing on the narrow question of the 
willingness and ability of state courts to enforce federal rights, the 
concern with state–federal parity should embrace a broader range of 
jurisdictional concurrency.  Rather than attempting to influence the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s allocational decisions, the new empirics will better 
assist other actors in the state–federal judicial partnership.  This Article 
therefore recommends that scholars interested in the relationship between 
state and federal courts focus on the comparative capacity of these court 
systems.  So conceived, the parity question is methodologically tractable 
in light of intervening developments in the social sciences.  The question 
is also newly relevant as movements for racial justice are actively working 
to abolish qualified immunity, grappling with whether this goal is better 
pursued at the state level, the federal level, or both.17 
Part I of this Article provides a critical recapitulation of three themes 
that animated the parity debate as it unfolded some forty years ago, 
providing an intellectual history of this literature that explains why the 
parity debate ended—and why empirics are unhelpful to the debate as 
originally conceived. In particular, the parity debate foundered on its 
preoccupation with criticizing U.S. Supreme Court allocational decisions 
on the mistaken assumption that the doctrine was based on an empirical 
concept of state–federal court equivalence.  
Part II argues for the possibility of a theoretically sophisticated 
 
 15. See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Why Parity Matters, 71 B.U. L. REV. 651 (1991). 
 16. Burt Neuborne, Parity Revisited: The Uses of a Judicial Forum of Excellence, 44 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 797 (1995). 
 17. Section 4 of the BREATHE Act, drafted by the Movement for Black Lives, would abolish 
qualified immunity under federal law, abrogating that part of the U.S. Supreme Court’s § 1983 
jurisprudence.  See MOVEMENT FOR BLACK LIVES, THE BREATHE ACT: SECTION 4: HOLDING OFFICIALS 
ACCOUNTABLE & ENHANCING SELF-DETERMINATION OF BLACK COMMUNITIES 7, 
https://breatheact.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Section-4-The-BREATHE-Act-Summary.pdf (last 
visited September 28, 2021); see also Jay Schweikert, Colorado Passes Historic, Bipartisan Policing 
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empiricism of parity.  It begins by retheorizing the parity debate itself.  
Then, the Part proposes a new model, conceiving of parity in terms of the 
comparative capacity of the state and federal court systems.  Part II also 
shows that although empirics are of limited relevance to the allocational 
emphasis of the parity debate of the 1970s and 1980s, they are critical to 
a comparative notion of parity that contemplates a wider array of 
decisionmakers within the court systems. 
Part III maps the existing empirical and methodological literature onto 
the comparative capacity model.  In short, the data that earlier parity 
scholars feared were impossible to collect have, for the most part, already 
been gathered and analyzed. 
Part IV discusses the implications of the new empirics of parity, calling 
for three changes in orientation to parity scholarship.  First, given that 
both the state and federal courts must hear many cases every year 
regardless of whether particular classes of cases are allocated to one 
system or the other, the debate must focus primarily on helping both types 
of courts to perform at their best.  Scholarship in this vein might 
productively be addressed to Congress and the state legislatures, whose 
job it is to resource the courts.  Second, Part IV invites federal courts 
scholars to consider where existing jurisdictional doctrine opens the door 
for judges beyond those on the U.S. Supreme Court to consider empirical 
information comparing the state and federal courts.  In particular, habeas 
and abstention cases are opportunities for litigants to brief, and federal 
district judges to evaluate, the quality of state-court adjudication.  Finally, 
Part IV advocates the creation of a new normative model of an adequate 
court system. Such a model could be used to develop comparative 
empirical assessments of state and federal courts, in turn giving rise to a 
new set of arguments for directing resources or shifting allocational 
doctrine. 
I. RETHEORIZING THE PARITY DEBATE 
“The parity debate” is not one debate, but several.  The claim that the 
conversation must come to an end, paradoxically, because it depends on 
intractable empirical questions is, at best, true as to only some of the many 
parity debates. This Part shows how empirical and normative questions 
matter differently in different discursive contexts, assessing parity at 
different levels of scale and with regard to different legal actors.  By 
clarifying this conversation, this Part shows how it can move forward.  It 
begins by distinguishing three separate parity debates, focusing in turn on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress, and the individual litigant.  Next, it 
provides a critical intellectual history of the parity debate, tracing the 
empirical and normative responses to Neuborne’s landmark article and 
5
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identifying productive and reductive interventions on both fronts.  
Finally, it focuses on the main theoretical problem of the earlier parity 
debate: its inability to recognize that it is not one, but many.  
The parity debate has operated at three levels of scale—levels that 
differ in their respective susceptibility to empirical analysis.  The first 
debate asks how the U.S. Supreme Court should allocate claims between 
the state court systems in the aggregate and the federal court system as a 
whole.  The second takes place at the level of Congress, which passes 
jurisdictional statutes allocating particular causes of action to state court, 
federal court, or both.  These statutes, combined with the Court’s 
allocational jurisprudence, create a framework of concurrency within 
which empirical inquiries operate and become relevant.  
The third debate takes place at the level of the individual litigant.  
(Here, the term “litigant” describes the party, often acting with advice of 
counsel.)  Within the framework of concurrency created by Congress and 
the Court, litigants determine where to file claims.  Whereas Congress 
and the Court make allocational decisions by comparing the state and 
federal court systems as a whole, litigants make their personal allocational 
decisions with regard to a small and specific set of fora.  The scope of 
relevant factual information is thus far more constricted and, as a result, 
can be richer and more detailed.  
Each of these debates draws upon different sources of information and 
law.  The first and second have the power to shape the law; the third deals 
with law and facts as they exist.  Empirical evidence, then, varies in the 
role it plays depending on the parity debate one is having.  The next 
Sections question how some prior writers on parity have mapped empirics 
onto each level of scale and propose an alternate mapping.  
A. Framing the Parity Debate: An Outcome-Driven Empirics of 
Constitutional Rights  
The existing parity debate has been made less generative by its 
obsessive topical focus on constitutional rights, especially those 
associated with left politics. The resulting discursive trajectory has shaped 
the theorization of parity as well as its empirical assessment.  Nearly every 
entrant to the field responds to Burt Neuborne’s landmark 1977 article 
The Myth of Parity.  That article begins with a discussion of Stone v. 
Powell,18 a Fourth Amendment habeas case in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court “appeared to assume that state and federal courts are functionally 
interchangeable forums likely to provide equivalent protection for federal 
 
 18. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
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constitutional rights.”19  
Neuborne then moves to a forceful critique of that perspective: “I 
suggest that the assumption of parity is, at best, a dangerous myth, 
fostering forum allocation decisions which channel constitutional 
adjudication under the illusion that state courts will vindicate federally 
secured constitutional rights as forcefully as would the lower federal 
courts.”20  The scope of Neuborne’s argument is confined to the relative 
competencies of state and federal courts in the adjudication of 
constitutional rights, making the argument that federal courts are more 
plaintiff-friendly.  Neuborne nowhere claims that his article does any 
more than this; the text is explicitly grounded in his own practice as a civil 
liberties lawyer.21 
The second part of the article takes up two empirical assumptions 
around which Neuborne structured his own litigation practice.  First is 
that “persons advancing federal constitutional claims against local 
officials will fare better, as a rule, in a federal, rather than a state, trial 
court.”22  The second assumption is that, “to a somewhat lesser degree, 
federal district courts are institutionally preferable to state appellate 
courts as forums in which to raise federal constitutional claims.”23  
Neuborne “kn[e]w of no empirical studies that prove (or undermine) those 
assumptions,” and proceeded to lay out a series of institutional parameters 
that were relevant to his determination of whether state courts were 
trustworthy arbiters of constitutional rights.24  In essence, the article 
sketches out an empirical rebuttal, based on a loose form of auto-
ethnography, to what Neuborne views as the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
implicit empirical claim about the equivalence of state and federal 
courts.25  
Subsequent writers have advanced the parity debate on the grounds of 
Neuborne’s rebuttal: by attempting to pursue the empirical inquiries that 
Neuborne outlined; by justifying or attacking, on doctrinal and normative 
grounds, the Court’s “assum[ption] that no factors exist which render 
federal district courts more effective than state trial or appellate courts for 
the enforcement of federal constitutional rights”26; and by providing 
alternate approaches to the assessment of state–federal court parity with 
regard to constitutional rights.  Commentators after Neuborne, therefore, 
 
 19. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1105. 
 20. Id. (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. at 1115. 
 22. Id. at 1115–16. 
 23. Id. at 1116. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1117; see also AUTO/ETHNOGRAPHY: REWRITING THE SELF AND THE SOCIAL (Deborah 
Reed-Danahay ed., 1997). 
 26. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1117. 
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have let his article establish the boundaries of the parity discussion in a 
way that Neuborne himself never explicitly intended.27 
Neuborne begins his process of empirical modeling by arguing that 
parity (particularly within the habeas context) is often assessed via “a 
comparison that tends to measure the federal district courts against state 
appellate courts,” and suggests instead that a cleaner assessment begins 
with a more rigorous theorization of “which state forum should be 
compared with the federal district courts to determine whether a 
comparative advantage exists.”28  Neuborne advocates an apples-to-
apples comparison of state trial courts with federal district courts.29  
Chemerinsky views the question as systemic, arguing that “[t]he parity 
question demands an overall comparison of the federal courts with the 
state courts,” but noting that the heterogeneity of both systems undermine 
the usefulness of such a comparison even if it could be produced.30  Others 
have viewed the question as answerable only from the litigant’s 
perspective31 (which, as Resnik reminds us, must include recognition that 
“the often-invoked description of the federal courts as comprised of a 
three-tiered pyramid of courts fails to capture the sprawling structure into 
which the federal judicial system, consisting of courts, agencies, and 
private-affiliated decision makers, has evolved.”).32 
Amar thinks Neuborne’s model is too narrow, framing the parity 
question as “about state court jurisdiction versus the federal judicial 
power of the United States as a whole.”33  In particular, Amar identifies 
the failure of the federal court system as a whole to perform this appellate 
function as the fulcrum of the parity question:  
If the Supreme Court cannot discharge its appellate function today, the real 
question is whether lower federal courts need to fill the breach because 
they have constitutional parity with the Supreme Court in a way that state 
courts do not, and because they are article III tribunals in a way that state 
courts are not.34   
 
 27. Ann Althouse, Federal Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Federal Rights: Can Congress 
Bring Back the Warren Era?, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1067, 1070 (1995) (“One would think, then, that 
the ‘Myth of Parity’ exercise would need to be wholly redone in response to changed conditions.  Indeed, 
one might also question whether the subjective observations of a lawyer for a particular subcategory of 
litigants ought ever to have had great persuasive pull.”). 
 28. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1118. 
 29. Id. at 1119. 
 30. Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 13, at 599–600; see also Chemerinsky, 
Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 259. 
 31. Redish, supra note 10, at 336. 
 32. Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective 
Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 171, 172 (1995). 
 33. Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 645. 
 34. Id. at 646–48. 
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For Amar, then, the Constitution also commands a recognition that the 
two systems are not similarly situated. 
Some writers imply that the entire project of finding proper 
comparators is specious.  For Wells, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court 
is to blame by creating unstable doctrinal terrain:  
The Court insists that there is parity, but does not specify precisely what it 
means by parity: does it deem state courts the virtual equals of federal 
courts, in that the outcome of a suit would be the same in state as in federal 
court, or does it acknowledge a gap yet consider that gap too small to 
require a federal forum?35   
Without clarity in the doctrine, it is impossible to develop a comparative 
methodological approach.  Elsewhere, Wells has identified this as the 
definitional problem of “weak” versus “strong” conceptions of parity:  
The assertion of parity between state and federal courts may refer to a claim 
that a litigant will receive a constitutionally adequate hearing on a federal 
claim in state court.  In contrast with this ‘weak’ sense of parity, the 
‘strong’ sense of the term signifies the fungible nature of state and federal 
courts and the absence of a systematic difference in outcomes whether 
cases are allotted to state or federal courts.36  
A conspicuous problem of the literature is the lack of robust 
theorization that Wells identifies.  Without a prior model of parity as 
strong (implying that courts of original jurisdiction in both systems are 
the relevant points of comparison), weak (implying that attention to the 
institutional characteristics of, and outcomes in, state court is adequate 
perhaps without comparison to federal court), or something else entirely 
à la Amar, it is difficult to develop a rigorous research design. 
Neuborne also notes that state courts need not act in bad faith to be 
unreliable: the “comparison need only suggest that given the institutional 
differences between the two benches, state trial judges are less likely to 
resolve arguable issues in favor of protecting federal constitutional rights 
than are their federal brethren.”37  This strongly implies that outcome, 
rather than process, is—for Neuborne—the relevant metric.  
Indeed, subsequent efforts by federal courts scholars to take up 
Neuborne’s empirical charge have largely focused on whether 
constitutional rights plaintiffs get the same kinds of outcomes in state and 
federal courts.38  Eisenberg, for example, conducted a descriptive study 
 
 35. Michael Wells, Is Disparity a Problem?, 22 GA. L. REV. 283, 285 (1988). 
 36. Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in the 
Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 610 (1991). 
 37. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1119–20. 
 38. But win rates are not necessarily indicative about much regarding a court system as a whole.  
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About the 
Legal System: Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998). 
9
McBride: Parity as Comparative Capacity
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] PARITY AS COMPARATIVE CAPACITY 77 
based on a sample of § 1983 cases filed in the Central District of 
California in 1975 and 1976, concluding that such cases (surprisingly) 
were not overburdening the federal court system.39  Gerry, in 1999, 
compared state and federal district court interpretations of Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission, concluding that the court systems are 
“startling in their similarity.”40  Marvell, in 1984, claimed that “parity 
does not exist” on the basis of data about lawyers’ rationales for forum 
selection in student rights cases.41  Rubenstein used a similar outcomes-
oriented research design to contest Neuborne’s central point, using his 
experience as a gay-rights litigator in the 1990s to argue that state courts 
are actually more favorable to the assertion of individual rights than 
federal courts.42  Solimine and Walker’s 1983 study is perhaps the best 
known of such outcome-focused work, defining parity as existing “if, 
holding all other factors constant, a litigant is, on the average, equally 
successful in both the federal and state court systems.”43  They found, 
rather flatly, that, taking state appellate courts into account, parity does 
exist.44  And Urquhart, writing in 2011, adopts Solimine and Walker’s 
methods to compare the success rates of litigants asserting federal claims 
after Younger proceedings in state courts versus federal courts, finding 
much higher success rates in the latter circumstance.45  But such one-
dimensional focus on outcomes alone has been critiqued.  The serious 
methodological problems with such studies notwithstanding,46 outcomes 
 
 39. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 
67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 521–24 (1981). 
 40. Brett Christopher Gerry, Parity Revisited: An Empirical Comparison of State and Lower 
Federal Court Interpretations of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
233, 241, 285 (1999). 
 41. Thomas B. Marvell, The Rationales for Federal Question Jurisdiction: An Empirical 
Examination of Student Rights Litigation, 1984 WISC. L. REV. 1315, 1338–39, 1358 (1984) (asserting that 
parity does not exist, empirically, and lawyers stating that federal judges are more likely to enforce federal 
law, among other reasons for choosing federal court).  This study is an example of how earlier empirical 
studies of parity made claims that were disproportionately broad as compared with what their results 
show—here, claiming that parity simply does not exist, rather than asserting more modestly that the study 
showed substantial differences between the state and federal courts regarding one area of law, from the 
litigant perspective. 
 42. See generally William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599 
(1999). 
 43. Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State 
Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 232 (1983). 
 44. Id. at 232, 250.  This is another study that overclaims. 
 45. Joshua G. Urquhart, Younger Abstention and Its Aftermath: An Empirical Perspective, 
12 NEV. L.J. 1, 3, 44, 47 (2011).  This study has serious methodological flaws, many of which are also 
present in Solimine & Walker, supra note 43: the use of a date range that seems arbitrary, reliance on 
Westlaw, undertheorized and informal approaches to coding, and an unsystematic approach to checking 
one’s work. 
 46. See Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 261–69 (highlighting 
methodological problems in the Walker & Solimine study, including: a focus only on decisions rather 
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alone are most relevant under strong-parity models that define parity as 
the complete fungibility of the two court systems.47 
Finally, Neuborne challenged the assumption that federal judges are 
“carpetbaggers,” instead emphasizing that they are “root[ed] in the 
communities they serve” just as much as state judges.48  Other 
commentators did not really take up this point; thus, it is hard to know 
whether they agree with Neuborne or simply think the issue irrelevant.  
After sweeping away what he viewed as incorrect factual assumptions, 
Neuborne built his comparative model by laying out “three sets of 
reasons” that support plaintiffs’ civil liberties attorneys’ preferences for 
federal fora.49  Neuborne, unlike subsequent writers on parity, did not 
claim that these three reasons formed a comprehensive, comparative 
model of parity.  They are: (1) the judges’ technical competence—
Neuborne believed federal judges to be more competent; (2) the judges’ 
“psychological set”—Neuborne believed federal judges to be more 
amenable than state judges to plaintiffs asserting federal constitutional 
claims; and (3) the federal courts’ relatively greater “insulation from 
majoritarian pressures,” making them “structurally preferable to state trial 
court as a forum in which to challenge powerful local interests.”50  
Most contributors to the parity literature seem to agree with Neuborne 
that federal judges are more competent.  Such competence includes not 
only the judges’ own technical skills, but also structural features of federal 
courts that (in these writers’ view) enable any judge to perform her best 
work.  These features include comparatively higher pay, the higher 
numbers and perceived greater talents of law clerks to which they have 
access, and their somewhat more leisurely schedule.51  The greater 
selectivity and prestige of the federal bench is considered to draw a higher 
caliber of lawyer—though lawyer quality is not often defined in these 
writings—than the state bench.52  Chemerinsky cautions that “there is no 
 
than including cases that settle, not taking account of the potential that state and federal courts may not be 
deciding a similar pool of cases depending on rates of and reasons for settlement, focusing only on state 
appellate courts without controlling for how many cases are appealed and on what grounds, not accounting 
for differences in the subject matter of cases or whether they are comparable in their substantive content, 
not analyzing the comparative likelihood that Congress as opposed to state legislatures will enact 
unconstitutional criminal statutes, not controlling for the availability of removal by claim type, not relying 
on independent metrics of court quality, not controlling for federal courts ruling against a claim on 
procedural grounds, and making an apples-to-oranges comparison of federal district and state appellate 
courts). 
 47. Wells, supra note 36, at 610; see also Herman, supra note 15, at 652–53; Neuborne, supra 
note 16, at 797, 803; Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 228. 
 48. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1120. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1120–21. 
 51. Paul Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
605, 623 (1981). 
 52. Id. 
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reason to believe that ‘better’ judges will produce decisions that 
systematically favor individual rights,” pointing to Justice Antonin Scalia 
and former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski as two federal judges who 
were widely considered brilliant but who rarely decided in favor of 
individual rights.53  From a litigant-choice perspective, Flango notes that 
attorneys themselves “tend to view federal judges as better trained, better 
supported with resources, and more impartial because they are not 
elected,” and that such attorneys attempt to funnel complex litigation to 
federal court in the belief that federal judges are better equipped to handle 
such cases.54  But this may perpetuate a vicious cycle: state judges cannot 
be expected to manage complex questions of federal law if they never get 
a chance to do so.55  Others have noted that it is unfair to scrutinize the 
competence of state-court judges in interpreting federal law without 
asking how good federal judges are at interpreting state law, such as in 
diversity cases.56  Yet the precise contours of judicial competence remain 
unmapped. 
Neuborne’s theory of “psychological set,” by contrast, has not been 
received as enthusiastically.  Though Neuborne identifies it as one of his 
three primary reasons for preferring federal court, only Chemerinsky 
mentions it, and at some remove.57  Some writers evaluate the 
consequences of judges’ relative levels of insulation from majoritarian 
and quotidian pressures; Bator, for example, cites the “intuitive” 
contention that a “sensitivity to federal rights is reinforced by the federal 
judges’ relative insulation from the daily grind of legal administration in 
our state and municipal lower criminal, family, and civil courts, which is 
said to breed cynicism and callousness with respect to abstract-sounding 
constitutional rights.”58 
Neuborne identifies the structural insulation created by Article III’s 
appointment and life tenure provisions as crucial to federal judges’ 
greater, even countermajoritarian inclination to enforce constitutional 
rights.59  Redish regards these protections as definitive: “the absence of 
prophylactic protections of state judicial salary and tenure is so 
 
 53. Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 13, at 599. 
 54. Victor E. Flango, Litigant Choice between State and Federal Courts, 46 S.C. L. REV. 961, 
973–74 (1995). 
 55. See Althouse, supra note 27, at 1078–79; Evan Tsen Lee, On the Received Wisdom in Federal 
Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1123 (1999); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, supra note 6, at 1129; Gil 
Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 97–99 (2009). 
 56. Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1293, 1299–1300 (2003); Marcia L. McCormick, When Worlds Collide: Federal Construction of State 
Institutional Competence, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1167, 1173 (2007). 
 57. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 277. 
 58. Bator, supra note 51, at 623. 
 59. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1127. 
12
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/2
80 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
inconsistent with concepts of basic fairness as to violate procedural due 
process.”60  Bator concedes that federal judges are probably better 
“insulated from majoritarian pressures and will therefore be more 
receptive to controversial and unpopular constitutional principles,” but 
aspires nonetheless to help state courts “become a more hospitable forum, 
that the rhetoric of parity becomes reality.”61  No commentators seriously 
challenge the countermajoritarian affordances of Article III.62  The 
question becomes whether state judges can judge fairly despite being 
subject to electoral pressures.63 
In The Myth of Parity, Neuborne’s empirics of experience, mobilized 
to critique the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent jurisdictional decisions, 
invited subsequent commentators to think about parity as exclusively 
allocational and susceptible to assessment solely by recourse to case 
outcomes.  This approach to parity is valuable in its own right, but limited, 
and the debate has consequently run aground.  But this narrow view of 
parity contains within it a broader comparative terrain.  Neuborne’s “three 
sets of reasons” draw in questions of judicial decision-making, litigant 
behavior, the resourcing of court systems, and the relationship between 
jurisdictional doctrines and the lower-court judges who must implement 
them.  
B. Parity for Whom? Assessing Parity at Different Levels of Scale 
To model parity empirically requires an answer to the antecedent 
question, “parity for whom?”  The parity debate has stalled in large part 
because this question has not been theorized nor even fully surfaced.  And 
parity looks much different from the vantage point of each actor and level 
of scale within the judicial system. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s responsibility is to assess the federal system 
as a whole, as compared with the state system as a whole, in making 
allocational decisions.  The fundamental ground of this particular debate 
 
 60. Redish, supra note 10, at 335–36. 
 61. Bator, supra note 51, at 623–24. 
 62. See also Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 275–76; Amanda Frost & 
Stefanie A. Lindquist, Countering the Majoritarian Difficulty, 96 VA. L. REV. 719, 722–23 (2010). 
 63. Solimine proposes avenues for further research.  See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of 
Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1471–72 (2005). The empirical literature indicates that elections 
do have substantial impact on how state judges make decisions—see notes 168–195, infra, and 
accompanying text.  See also Frost & Lindquist, supra note 62, at 722–23; Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic 
Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1440–41, 1441–42 
(1999).  But see Bator, supra note 51, at 624 (“[I]t is virtually inevitable that state courts will in fact 
continue to be asked to play a substantial role in the formulation and application of federal constitutional 
principles; the arguments in favor of the federal forum will not lead to a monopoly. If this is so, a new 
problem of fundamental significance emerges: we must try to create conditions to assure optimal 
performance by the state courts.”).  
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is Article III.  Jurisdictional statutes and the Court’s own allocational 
jurisprudence are also relevant, not least as objects of critique.64  First, 
normative views about state sovereignty dictate allocational approach.65  
That is, the Court often deals with allocation as a pure question of law, 
whether formally or functionally.66  The empirical design implication of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s allocational task—to the extent that the Court 
or its observers seek to approach this work empirically, which this Article 
later argues that it (mostly) does not and should not—is that the Court 
needs both to have and to understand data on the aggregate federal courts 
and the aggregate state courts, so that it can direct classes of cases to 
classes of courts.  As others have pointed out,67 such an empirical task is 
difficult, if not impossible, posing conceptual problems of sampling and 
variability and practical problems of data collection and analysis.  In part 
for this reason, commentators such as Amar and Redish have argued that 
parity should be assessed exclusively as a constitutional and perhaps 
statutory issue.68  
Litigants, by contrast, have responsibilities only to themselves.  
Litigants want to win and to feel fairly heard.69  Parity from the litigant 
perspective looks very much like a comparison of win rates under 
particular doctrinal conditions in the first instance—“strong parity”—and 
like a set of parameters for procedural fairness and constitutional 
adequacy in the second instance—“weak parity.”70  The litigant-choice 
model advanced by Chemerinsky and others is therefore unsatisfying on 
its own.  Even if we agree that as a matter of law litigants have a choice 
between federal and state courts where concurrent jurisdiction exists, we 
may still be interested in how they exercise that freedom of choice.  That 
is, litigant choice should be used not to foreclose, but rather to structure 
empirics of parity.  Information on attorneys’ strategic decisions under 
conditions of concurrency tells us that, at a minimum, litigants often view 
the systems as different.71  In turn, litigants jockey for competitive 
 
 64. Amar and Redish, for example, are thinking about parity essentially from the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s perspective. See Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 649; Redish, supra 
note 10, at 336.  
 65. See Part II, infra, for further discussion. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 599–600; Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 214–15; 
Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 645–46. 
 68. Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 645; Redish, supra note 10, at 
332–33. 
 69. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice? Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the 
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103 (1988). 
 70. Wells, supra note 36, at 610; Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 13, at 602–
04.  
 71. Flango, supra note 54, at 973–74; Seinfeld, supra note 55, at 138; Solimine & Walker, supra 
note 43, at 245; Michael E. Solimine, Rethinking Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 383, 
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advantage, giving rise to normative questions about how and whether 
jurisdictional design should privilege certain litigants.72  Parity for 
litigants is therefore partially empirical and partially normative.  But the 
empirical information on which litigants rely is likely to be that of lived 
experience.73  The prospect of moving beyond such rules of thumb to drill 
down into comparative data at the level of the individual court is as 
daunting as the prospect of aggregating such data.  
At the highest level of abstraction—for U.S. Supreme Court Justices—
empirics may not be possible, useful, or normatively desirable.  
Nonetheless, the Court processes hundreds, perhaps thousands, of 
petitions seeking review of state court decisions each year, providing the 
Justices with valuable, if slanted, information about lower courts’ 
behavior.74  At the lowest, most granular level—for litigants—a rough 
empiricism is inescapable. Congress also has the authority to pass 
jurisdictional statutes, and may choose to do so on the basis of either 
empirical or normative considerations, or both.75  Empirics matter a lot if 
state and federal courts need to be fully fungible in order to be in parity 
but less so if they merely need to be loosely comparable or exceed some 
minimum level of constitutional adequacy.76  In the end, as Herman 
writes:  
The empirical inquiry into parity serves the normative question about when 
federal court review should be made available. If one’s premise is that 
federal courts should always have jurisdiction over federal constitutional 
claims, regardless of state courts’ competency, then parity or disparity is 
 
412–13 (1991); e.g., Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1115–16. 
 72. See Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 648–49; Martin H. Redish, 
Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction 
and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1777–78 (1992); Wells, supra note 36, at 611; see 
also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 38, at 599.  See generally Bator, supra note 51. 
 73. Flango, supra note 54, at 973; Seinfeld, supra note 55, at 135–39.  See generally Calabresi, 
supra note 56. 
 74. See, e.g., The Statistics, 134 HARV. L. REV. 610 (2020) (containing Harvard Law Review’s 
compilation of statistics on the most recent U.S. Supreme Court term). The statistics do not show how 
many petitions for certiorari sought review of state court decisions, but the Court considered a total of 
5,718 petitions, of which it granted review in 60.  Id. at 618.  Of the Court’s 149 dispositions reviewed on 
writ of certiorari in October Term 2019, twenty-one of them, or 14 percent, originated in state courts.  Id. 
at 619–20.  Of course, it is difficult to know whether the distribution of cases granted is representative of 
the certiorari pool itself, but assuming it were, the Court would have reviewed approximately 800 petitions 
from state court decisions.  The number could be higher, given that 4,201 of the petitions considered were 
filed in forma pauperis, id. at 618, and many of these are likely to have sought either direct review of state 
court decisions or indirect review via federal habeas claims.  Only four of those 4,201 were granted review.  
Id. 
 75. See, e.g., Denise C. Morgan & Rebecca E. Zietlow, The New Parity Debate: Congress and 
Rights of Belonging, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1347, 1347–48 (2005); Richard Fallon, The Ideologies of Federal 
Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1145–46 (1988). 
 76. Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 13, at 599–600; Chemerinsky, Parity 
Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 259, 261–69. 
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irrelevant. If one believes that federal court review is unnecessary as long 
as state courts are reasonably receptive to federal constitutional claims, 
then parity, in the sense of equivalence, may still not matter, but disparity 
will.77 
II. REBUILDING THE PARITY DEBATE—FROM ALLOCATION TO 
INSTITUTIONS 
The field of federal courts need not give up on parity.  By changing 
focus from allocational doctrine to institutional comparison, both 
normative and empirical modes of analysis become newly relevant.  This  
Part transitions from allocation to institutions.  This Part begins by 
showing why the parity debate stalled on the question of empirics and 
recalibrates what the field can reasonably expect from data on the courts.  
Next, it pursues a close reading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s late-
twentieth-century allocational doctrine, showing how the earlier 
allocation-focused parity debate proceeded on the mistaken assumption 
that the Court based its decisions on empirics.  This reading shows instead 
that the Court relies on normative conceptions of state sovereignty within 
our federal system.  Having thus deconstructed the earlier empirics of 
parity, this Part ends by rebuilding a new empirical approach.  The 
resulting comparative capacity model is methodologically sound, 
theoretically elegant, and enables an empirics that is more responsive to 
existing doctrine. 
The parity debate of the 1980s and early 1990s petered out after 
influential writers in the field of federal courts agreed that the parity 
question was both inherently empirical and empirically intractable.  This 
claim was enabled by a failure to disentangle the various parity debates 
from each other and examine how their differing normative claims 
required different forms of empirical inquiry.  In other words, parity is 
not an empirical question but many empirical questions.  
In 1988, Chemerinsky wrote, “I fear that the debate over parity is 
permanently stalemated because parity is an empirical question—whether 
one court system is as good as another—for which there can never be any 
meaningful empirical measure.”78  He further noted that developing 
criteria to enable measurement of such nebulous yet essential concepts as 
judicial competence, decisional correctness, and institutional quality is 
nearly impossible.79  Chemerinsky “question[ed] the usefulness of an 
aggregate evaluation”—which he believes to be the only empirical path 
forward—“of court systems as large and varied as those of fifty states and 
 
 77. Herman, supra note 15, at 652–53. 
 78. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 236. 
 79. Id. at 256–57. 
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ninety-one federal districts.”80  Though he acknowledges the possibility 
that some kind of sprawling project might collect data on the court 
systems of individual states, he views this as a completely “different 
inquiry from the current focus on parity,” which he defines as “an overall 
comparison of the state court systems with the federal courts with regard 
to protecting individual liberties.”81  
For Chemerinsky, then, no study (or perhaps even group of studies) can 
be designed to provide a conclusive empirical answer to a narrowly 
tailored version of the parity question.  He explains: “The problem is that 
without empirical measurement, each side of the parity debate simply has 
an intuitive judgment about whether the institutional differences between 
federal and state courts matter in constitutional cases. Each side explains 
its position, but neither has any way to prove it or refute the opposing 
claim.”82  This is a remarkably positivist position for someone rejecting 
the possibility of empirics altogether.  It is also unusual in the context of 
legal scholarship, which has established over hundreds of years a rich set 
of normative, qualitative, and logical styles of argument that are widely 
deployed—and widely considered rigorous and persuasive.83 This 
positivist rejection of both empirical and nonempirical modes of analysis 
led to a foreclosure of the parity question, causing Chemerinsky to fall 
back on a “litigant choice principle” which he hoped would appeal to 
“both sides” and allow a final resolution of the question of parity without 
engaging, let alone relying upon, empirics.84   
Redish also thinks the parity debate is over, but because it never should 
have begun.85  For Redish, the factual differences between the two 
systems, due to Article III, are so stark that they are self-evident and 
require no systemic investigation, as if the question could even be asked 
in the first place.86  Amar finds these rationales superseded by one even 
more compelling: “Parity, to my mind, is not so much an empirical 
question as a constitutional question. In effect, the Constitution itself 
provides an answer to the empirical issue.”87 
This Article instead offers normative principles to ground, rather than 
end, the parity debate.  The empirical assessment of parity is possible, but 
 
 80. Id. at 260. 
 81. Id. (emphasis in original).  Chemerinsky also recognizes that a comparison between court 
systems could be grounded in other substantive bodies of law and/or heads of jurisdiction.  
 82. Id. at 278–79.  But see Bator, supra note 51, at 623 (“It is immediately apparent that these 
contentions are intuitive; they rest on human insight rather than on empirical evidence or scientific 
measurement. But they surely cannot be dismissed on that account.”). 
 83. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2002). 
 84. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 300. 
 85. Redish, supra note 10, at 330–31, 342. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 645; see also id. at 646. 
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perhaps not definitively so—because no type of evidence, empirical or 
otherwise, can provide a definitive answer to any complex question, with 
few exceptions.  An empirically-informed parity debate is likewise 
possible and desirable, but the field’s expectations will have to be brought 
into line with disciplinary methodological thinking.  First, no one study 
will definitively tell us whether or not parity exists between the state and 
federal courts or any subset thereof.  “[T]he debate is not susceptible to a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, unless one is asking a very narrow version of that 
question.”88  Like other careful and rigorous empirically-informed 
approaches to complex questions, the empirical evidence we should look 
to will consist in a body of work, with each piece making its own 
contribution and likely contesting other pieces of evidence.  Those 
engaging in an empirically-informed parity debate should seek to make 
arguments marshaling various pieces of evidence rather than obediently 
looking to one study to end the conversation.  (And even the most 
perfectly designed study would have to be repeated later in time.)89  
Second, regardless of how one conceives of parity, it cannot be 
assessed without recourse to a broadly comparative body of data about 
the state and federal courts as institutions.  Even Neuborne’s narrow 
approach required a wide-ranging factfinding mission.  Additionally, the 
empirical conversation cannot be limited to the federal courts literature 
but must be interdisciplinary, drawing on methods, insights, and studies 
from a variety of social science fields. 
Third and finally, empirics alone, even so conceived, are insufficient 
to answer, let alone ask, the parity question.  The parity literature as a 
whole has suffered from a lack of theoretical clarity.  Without a nuanced 
normative and doctrinal definition of what it would mean for state and 
federal courts to be in parity, it is impossible to design studies that could 
measure parity in any convincing way.  Wells identifies the confusion as 
one between “strong” and “weak” models of parity.90  Bator identifies the 
stakes of the inquiry by arguing that:  
The question is not, tout court, whether federal and state courts stand in 
parity.  The question is whether a preference for the federal forum justifies 
removing to federal court all state court enforcement proceedings in which 
a federal question is raised; or justifies relitigating all federal questions 
already adjudicated in the state courts; or justifies separate federal litigation 
of all federal defenses in injunctive or declaratory actions in the face of 
 
 88. Herman, supra note 15, at 651. 
 89. See Althouse, supra note 27, at 1070; Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, supra note 13, 
at 603; Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases between Federal and 
State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1222–23 (2004); Herman, supra note 15, at 651–52; Resnik, 
supra note 32, at 172; Solimine, supra note 63, at 1487. See generally Neuborne, supra note 16.  
 90. See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text. 
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pending or impending state court enforcement proceedings.91   
Amar “suggest[s] instead that the Constitution itself has made certain 
policy decisions” and thus that the need for any empirics is obviated.92  
Each of these authors has committed to a differing view of parity, each 
of which has its own specific implications for research design and 
evaluation.  Such commitments are generative; by contrast, those who 
have committed to no clear and particularized model of parity have been 
unable to move the conversation forward. By asking what parity might 
mean for different types of people, the field becomes able to propose new 
models. 
A. Moving Beyond Allocation 
Though earlier writers on parity found much to debate, they agreed on 
one thing: the U.S. Supreme Court made its allocational decisions on the 
basis of empirical assessment of the state and federal court systems.  Early 
participants in the parity debate often attacked the empirical factors that 
were thought to inform the Court’s allocational doctrine.  For example, 
Neuborne argued that the Court “presently seems bent on resolving forum 
allocation decisions by assuming that no factors exist which render 
federal district courts more effective than state trial or appellate courts for 
the enforcement of federal constitutional rights,” and that he “hope[d] to 
challenge the Court’s present assumptions” by means of his empirical 
discussion.93  Wells said that “[t]he Court has changed its attitude toward 
and response to the gap between federal and state courts,” first ignoring 
that gap, then “prefer[ring] state adjudication because of the lack of 
parity.”94  Chemerinsky wrote that “the Court has repeatedly justified its 
holdings by invoking conclusions about the relative competence of state 
and federal courts.”95  As a result, the parity debate has been geared 
toward the U.S. Supreme Court and allocational critique.96 
This consensus, however, is unfounded.  The Court does not now, and 
did not in the 1970s and 1980s, ground its allocational judgments in 
empirical assumptions or arguments.  Instead, the Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts repeatedly used equitable discretion to establish nebulous 
doctrinal principles like comity and “Our Federalism” to navigate the 
fraught intergovernmental relationships of our federal system. The word 
parity itself is not used in any cases that ground the parity literature. This 
 
 91. Bator, supra note 51, at 610–11. 
 92. Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 649. 
 93. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1117. 
 94. Wells, supra note 35, at 319–20. 
 95. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 245. 
 96. Wells, supra note 36, at 609–10. 
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Section shows that the Court’s reasoning is normative, grounded in 
principles of federalism and judicial administration, rather than empirical. 
Removing this fundamental ground of the parity debate has at least two 
major implications.  First, federal courts scholars should reconsider their 
reliance on empirically-inflected critiques of the Court’s allocational 
doctrine, unless the aim of the critique is to undertake the much larger 
task of convincing the Court to change the epistemological basis of its 
allocational jurisprudence.  Empirical arguments about the relative 
competence of state and federal fora are much better addressed elsewhere, 
such as when federal district court judges are deciding habeas or 
abstention claims.  Second, the empirics of parity must go beyond steering 
filing decisions under particular conditions of concurrency.  Accepting 
the jurisdictional framework as a given, or at least, as susceptible only to 
normative and doctrinal critiques, the field must understand, empirically, 
how this framework has structured all substantive dimensions of the 
relationship between the state and federal courts: in particular, where 
doctrine positions federal courts as coming into play only when state 
courts, individually or collectively, have failed in some way, and where 
the substantive law of one kind of government crosses forum boundaries, 
to be heard in the courts of the other kind of government.  
Stone v. Powell was an inflection point in the development of the 
allocational relationship between state and federal courts, as the Burger 
Court constrained the Warren Court’s expansive approach to federal 
jurisdiction.  Neuborne critiqued the decision as reflecting a naïve 
“assum[ption] that state and federal courts are functionally 
interchangeable forums likely to provide equivalent protection for federal 
constitutional rights.”97  But Stone itself holds only that “where the State 
has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth 
Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas 
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional 
search or seizure was introduced at his trial.”98  Stone required only an 
opportunity for litigation of the federal constitutional claim—not a 
guarantee that the state court would necessarily find in favor of the 
plaintiff or that the result would be the same (one way or the other) in 
state as in federal court. 
Indeed, the Stone Court recognized that the police likely obtained the 
evidence in question in a search that violated the Fourth Amendment.99  
Given that the opinion does not rule out the possibility that the state court 
completely failed to vindicate a valid constitutional claim, but nonetheless 
holds that the habeas petitioner did have a “full and fair opportunity” to 
 
 97. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1105. 
 98. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). 
 99. Id. at 481–82, 490–95. 
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litigate that claim, the Court at best endorses “weak parity” here rather 
than, as Neuborne reads it, asserting “functional interchangeab[ility].” 
Stone hardly “celebrate[s]” parity.100  Rather, it essentially asserts that 
state courts must be trusted to resolve most Fourth Amendment issues 
correctly most of the time.  But Neuborne’s analysis seems to have 
skewed the parity debate.  Subsequent commentators have continued to 
treat Stone as an empirically-based decision. 
The abstention cases similarly show the Court’s reliance on normative 
equitable principles.  Thinking about parity in terms of abstention reveals 
that the litigant choice principle is at best a partial solution to the problem.  
As the Court noted in Mitchum v. Foster, the statutory language of the 
Anti-Injunction Act101 could have formed the basis of the decision as to 
whether or not to abstain in Younger v. Harris, but instead “the Court 
carefully eschewed any reliance on the statute in reversing the judgment, 
basing its decision instead upon what the Court called ‘Our 
Federalism[.]’”102  A much earlier abstention case, Railroad Comm’n of 
Texas v. Pullman Co., used similar language.  As the Pullman Court 
noted, earlier cases “reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our 
federal system whereby the federal courts, exercising a wise discretion, 
restrain their authority because of scrupulous regard for the rightful 
independence of the state governments and for the smooth working of the 
federal judiciary.”103  In these abstention cases, litigants, under conditions 
of concurrency, have properly chosen to file in federal courts—and have 
been rebuffed, because the federal forum has chosen to “further[] the 
harmonious relation between state and federal authority without the need 
of rigorous congressional restriction of [equitable] powers” by sending 
the case to another proper forum.104 
The abstention cases provide important, and contradictory, teachings 
about parity.  First, litigant choice is not dispositive.105  Second, federal 
courts focus on system-level, normative concerns in an effort to preserve 
the proper relationship between state and federal sovereigns.  Such 
 
 100. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1105. 
 101. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1948). 
 102. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972). 
 103. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). 
 104. Id.  This phenomenon again casts doubt on Chemerinsky’s litigant-choice solution to the parity 
problem, echoing Redish’s question: “[W]hat are we to do if the different litigants wish to choose different 
forums?”  Redish, supra note 72, at 1778. 
 105. By definition, the major abstention cases arose because one side wanted to be in federal court, 
and the other side wanted the case to remain in state court.  Again, Bator’s caution that “[t]he limitations, 
too, count as setting forth constitutional values” is apt.  Bator, supra note 51, at 631.  The reservation 
procedures established in England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam., 375 U.S. 411, 419 (1964), 
exemplify this tension.  A litigant may lose an abstention fight in federal court, be sent back to state court 
against her will, and then, if she fails to make an appropriate England reservation, will not be able to 
return to federal court due to res judicata issues. 
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decisions do not rest on particularized empirical determinations about the 
two fora.  In fact, these philosophical concerns can be overridden not by 
proving simply that state and federal courts are not in strict parity, but 
only by showing that state courts are unusually deficient.106  Third, 
however, and contrary to the Court’s explicit language, federal courts’ 
exercise of equitable discretion is potentially linked to an implicit judicial 
factfinding as to whether there are grounds for suspicion of the state 
court’s willingness or ability to enforce federal rights under the 
circumstances.107  The Court’s opinion in Colorado River Water 
Conservation District v. United States exemplifies these contradictions, 
holding that the federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to 
exercise their jurisdiction inasmuch as abstention “is the exception, not 
the rule,” and also abstention is appropriate in a host of situations where 
states simply have a strong interest in hearing the case in their own 
courts.108  Colorado River both recognizes the primacy of federal 
jurisdiction where lawful and encourages the federal courts to defer to the 
state courts for reasons of respect for state sovereignty, without 
contending that the state courts are equally competent.  In other words, 
Colorado River—decided in the same year as Stone v. Powell—is not at 
all concerned with parity in the “strong” sense of the term. 
As with abstention, the empirical question of parity seems almost 
irrelevant to habeas jurisprudence in the twenty-first century.  After the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)109 and 
a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions further narrowing the scope of 
review and relief under AEDPA, federal courts now ask only whether 
state-court proceedings either “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal 
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or 
“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 
proceeding.”110  A state-court decision is only “contrary to” precedent if 
it is completely “opposite” to the conclusion “reached by [the Supreme] 
Court on a question of law,” or “if the state court confronts facts that are 
materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and 
arrives at a result opposite to [the Court’s].”111 Together, Congress and 
 
 106. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454 
(1974). 
 107. See, e.g., Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 238–42. 
 108. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813, 817 (1976). 
 109. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214. 
 110. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (1996). 
 111. Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06 (2000). 
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the Court have created a doctrine that does not rely on traditional 
considerations of parity in empowering state courts to make near-final 
determinations of constitutional rights.  As a normative and positive 
matter, state courts need not even be comparable to, let alone 
“functionally interchangeable” with, federal courts in how they might 
decide the constitutional issues raised by habeas petitioners; they need 
only to reach results not “diametrically different” from how the U.S. 
Supreme Court has decided a particular issue.112  If this can be considered 
parity, it is the weakest version possible. 
Amar was right.  As a doctrinal matter, “the Constitution itself has 
made certain policy decisions,” and along with Congress’ jurisdictional 
statutes and the Supreme Court’s interpretive decisions, it “provides every 
bit as much of an answer on the wider [allocational] question as it does 
on the narrower question of whether state courts are constitutionally 
adequate to hear federal questions in the first instance.”113  Forty years 
into the parity debate, it seems clear that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
strongly normative approach to allocational issues relies mainly on a 
sense that state courts, as the judicial branches of coequal sovereigns, 
ought to be accorded respect in their determinations even if a federal court 
would likely come out quite differently on a particular question.  
At the highest levels of scale, jurisdictional design does not presume 
parity—let alone interchangeability—between state and federal courts at 
the initial point of adjudication.  Rather, the design aims to ensure a 
modicum of federal supervisory power over state decisions if they seem 
extraordinarily wrong.  The empirical implications are clear: the primary 
doctrinal question susceptible of empirical inquiry is whether state courts 
are meeting a constitutional baseline of competence; federal district 
courts may have some degree of latitude, under the guise of equitable 
discretion, to consider facts about state-court competence; and Congress 
is a better target of allocational critique than the Court, as it conceivably 
could change jurisdictional statutes on the basis of different legislative 
factfinding. 
B. Parity as Comparative Capacity 
1. The Old Empirics of Parity: Methodological and Normative Problems 
Federal courts scholars approaching parity empirically have done so in 
a thinly positivist manner.114  For these scholars, the parity question can 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Amar, Parity as a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 645, 647. 
 114. By contrast, see generally Rubenstein, supra note 42. Rubenstein’s empirics of personal 
experience provide a richer comparative understanding of state and federal courts than do many of the 
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be answered definitively in one study,115 or at most a small handful of 
studies, relying on a strong conception of parity that can therefore be 
measured by comparing outcomes in the two systems.116  Such studies 
expressly limit themselves to constitutional rights enforcement, staying 
within the contours (unintentionally) established by Neuborne.117  Some 
of these studies have made use of advocates’ views on federal and state 
court systems but have claimed that these are valid indicia of the 
characteristics of the court systems themselves, rather than a separate, 
albeit related, body of data.118  Most samples in empirical parity studies 
seem to be of convenience or, at best, weakly motivated.119  The analysis 
of outcomes data uses only basic descriptive statistics.120  Such forays into 
empiricism have not satisfied more doctrinally-minded federal courts 
scholars.121  
The methodological weaknesses of these studies are obvious, their 
theoretical problems less so.  In relying uncritically on a “strong” theory 
of parity without asking how the meaning and implications of parity shift 
depending on one’s vantage point, such studies use empiricism to 
foreclose, rather than open up, the parity conversation.  Instead, this 
Section argues that different models of parity that seem, at first, to be in 
opposition can be true simultaneously.  “Strong parity” may be how 
litigants strategize where they are likeliest to win.122  But litigants may 
also care about securing “weak” forms of parity in terms of fairness of 
process as a minimum.123  
In this way, the attempt to advance the litigant-choice model as a means 
of escaping the orientation toward outcomes reveals itself to be 
misguided.124  On what basis will litigants choose where to file their 
 
more systematized empirical studies of parity coming out of the federal courts field. 
 115. See, e.g., Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 214–15; Gerry, supra note 40, at 237–38; 
Marvell, supra note 41, at 1338–39. 
 116. See, e.g., Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 226, 232; Michael E. Solimine & James L. 
Walker, State Court Protection of Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 127 (1989). 
 117. See, e.g., Gerry, supra note 40, at 237; Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 214. 
 118. Marvell, supra note 41, at 1338–39; Flango, supra note 54, at 973–74.  The reception history 
of Neuborne’s The Myth of Parity is perhaps the best example of this tendency. 
 119. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 39, at 524; Marvell, supra note 41, at 1343–44; Solimine & 
Walker, supra note 43, at 238.  Cf. Gerry, supra note 40, at 238.  
 120. See, e.g., Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 238–39 n.118; id. at 239–246. 
 121. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 261–69. 
 122. Compare Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 300–01, with Amar, Parity as 
a Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 649. 
 123. See Herman, supra note 15, at 652–53.  But see Neuborne, supra note 16, at 803. 
 124. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 300–01; see also Amar, Parity as a 
Constitutional Question, supra note 9, at 649; Bator, supra note 51, at 631–32; Redish, supra note 72, at 
1778 (“Perhaps a greater problem with the free market rationale for litigant choice is the fact that 
competing litigants may have contradictory, or at least different, interests to be served in choosing a forum.  
For example, a plaintiff seeking to vindicate a federal right may prefer a federal forum because of its more 
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claims if not on a sense of competitive advantage?  The litigant-choice 
framework enables academics to avoid taking an empirically-informed 
comparative position, but it does not allow a litigant to do likewise. By 
contrast, for system-level decisionmakers—namely, members of 
Congress and the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court—and academic 
theorists, fairness of judging, or “weak” parity, becomes more 
determinative as one approaches a level of scale at which individual wins 
and losses recede in importance.125  Weak parity matters when allocating 
classes of cases; strong parity matters when it’s your own case at stake.  
The two models are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they coexist, but they 
address themselves to different decisionmakers. 
2. The New Empirics of Parity 
A comparative-capacity model of parity both encompasses and 
explains the parity debate’s focus on the assertion of particular federal 
rights in state courts.  The orientation toward comparative capacity is 
inspired by Neuborne, who framed his model as an “assess[ment of] the 
relative institutional capacity of state and federal courts to enforce 
constitutional doctrine.”126  But the model proposed here goes beyond 
Neuborne. It situates parity as conceptually encompassing the entire 
landscape of concurrency and boundary-crossing—all claims that could 
be brought in either state or federal court.  It deliberately includes forum 
choices at the beginning of the litigation (as in § 1983 or diversity cases) 
and cases that move from one system to the other depending on the 
progress of the litigation (as in habeas or abstention).  The question of 
parity takes on particular salience where allocational doctrine explicitly 
sets up a comparison between, or contemplates a complementary role for, 
state and federal courts, and where facts on the ground seem to 
differentiate the state and federal court systems.  Such “parity hot spots” 
are not static but change over time as allocational doctrine evolves and as 
practical realities—the politics of the courts, the makeup of the judiciary, 
and so forth—shift. 
Pace Neuborne, this Section proposes three major reasons why parity 
hot spots may or may not emerge.  First, as a threshold matter, allocational 
law creates affordances for parity to become relevant.  Where litigants 
may choose to file in either state or federal court, the strategic litigant will 
attempt to determine where she will have an advantage.  Where 
 
elaborate procedural mechanisms, shorter dockets, and greater sensitivity to federal rights.  For a mirror 
image of the exact same reasons, however, the defendant in the same case may prefer a state forum.”); 
Wells, supra note 36, at 611. 
 125. See Wells, supra note 36, at 610–11; see also Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 38. 
 126. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1118. 
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allocational doctrine simply does not allow for concurrency—for 
example, individuals charged with state crimes have no choice but to 
appear in state court—parity is irrelevant.127  Without a doctrinal 
framework allowing for overlap between court systems, the question of 
parity is meaningless. 
Second, certain areas of jurisdictional overlap draw heightened 
scrutiny under conditions of fact that make the choice of state versus 
federal court particularly salient.  For example, the statutes and doctrines 
around habeas make the question of the adequacy of state court 
proceedings salient in the first place;128 state judges face additional 
practical pressures to decide against criminal defendants in election years 
when the public expects a “tough on crime” approach, perhaps creating 
timeframes in which state courts are more likely to be hostile and even 
constitutionally deficient.129  One might also imagine that § 1983 cases 
alleging police brutality, say, might fare differently in local state and 
federal courts depending on public opinion regarding crime and issues of 
racial inequality.  State court judges facing reelection in years when the 
public is more concerned with crime may be more favorable to police; 
however, in the wake of the Black Lives Matter movement, it is 
conceivable that the reverse might become true.130  In short, where there 
is more at stake for judges when they decide for or against a certain type 
of litigant, areas of mere doctrinal concurrency become central sites of 
the parity debate.  
Third, questions of parity may arise because litigants themselves feel—
justifiably or not—that there are differences that matter between state and 
federal courts.  Recent developments in class action and diversity 
jurisdiction are particularly instructive.  Though the parity debate has 
primarily focused on the viability of federal claims in state court, state 
causes of action in federal courts present much the same set of questions.  
 
 127. At least as a matter of initial forum choice, though they may seek injunctions or habeas review 
in federal court. 
 128. See supra Part II(a). 
 129. See, e.g., Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on 
Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 107 (2007); Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, 
Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
741 (2013); Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jason P. Kelly, Judicial Selection and Death Penalty 
Decisions, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23 (2014); Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, State Public Opinion, the 
Death Penalty, and the Practice of Electing Judges, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 360 (2008).  
 130. Public opinion on contested issues seems to drive the decision-making of elected judges.  See 
supra note 129.  By contrast, where issues are less salient in the public discourse, elected judges are more 
independent.  See Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Amy Semet, Judicial Elections, Public 
Opinion, and Decisions on Lower-Salience Issues, 15 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 672 (2018) (showing that 
public opinion on environmental law, a low-salience issue, has little impact on judicial decision-making).  
Parity may be equally at stake with regard to both environmental law and criminal law, but a “hot spot,” 
where the independence of judges becomes at issue, may be more likely to emerge when the public pays 
attention. 
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Prior to 2005, class actions based on state law could be brought in state 
court, or in federal court if complete diversity was present.131  In that year, 
Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), which, 
among other reforms, extended federal diversity jurisdiction to class 
actions in which there is only minimal diversity (provided some other 
conditions are met).132 
Though much more could be said about CAFA, what is important here 
is that corporate litigants perceived state and federal courts not to be in 
parity, at least regarding class actions, and were able to formalize this 
preference through legislation.133  Preexisting doctrine in the realm of 
diversity jurisdiction provided for rough but imperfect concurrency; 
CAFA intervened to channel a much larger subset of state-law class action 
claims to federal court.  Contrary to many parity commentators’ belief 
that the federal courts are more plaintiff-friendly, in the class action realm, 
defense and plaintiffs’ bars alike believed state courts to be preferable for 
plaintiffs and federal courts for defendants.134  This reveals that parity 
needs to be assessed anew in each doctrinal area. 
For this reason, the comparative capacity model encompasses the 
existing parity debate and also goes beyond this narrow doctrinal context.  
The question of constitutional rights may be regarded as but one of the 
“hot spots” that lie at the intersection of doctrinal affordance, political 
salience, and litigant perception of competitive advantage.  One might 
also update the old parity debate by considering how the assertion of 
constitutional rights has changed since Neuborne originally wrote.  
Litigants on the political right increasingly bring claims under a new 
constellation of constitutional rights.135  Even when cabined to its original 
 
 131. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1996). 
 132. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4. CAFA’s changes 
to the diversity statute included, inter alia: defining class actions to include removed actions, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d)(1)(B), 28 U.S.C. § 1711(2); increasing the amount in controversy requirement to $5 million 
and permitting aggregation of multiple plaintiffs’ claims to reach this amount, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), 
(d)(6); instituting minimal as opposed to complete diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2). 
 133. David Marcus highlights the continuity between CAFA and the earlier debate over diversity 
jurisdiction leading up to Erie.  In the early twentieth century, Marcus writes, “[M]any lawyers believed 
that the federal judiciary as a whole harbored procorporate, antiregulatory tendencies that limited the reach 
of state law.”  Similarly, “CAFA supporters hope that this federalization of multistate class actions will 
result in fewer certified classes and thereby relieve defendants of liability of state law causes of action.  
Their faith in the statute rests on what they perceive to be an emergent hostility in the federal courts toward 
multistate class actions that allege state law causes of action.”  David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action 
Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 
1252 (2007). 
 134. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the 
New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823 (2008). 
 135. See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, A New (Republican) Litigation State?, 11 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 657 (2021). See also, e.g., John Yoo & James C. Phillips, The Second(-Class) Amendment: 
The Supreme Court Should Put Gun Rights on the Same Level as Other Constitutional Requirements, 
NAT’L REV. (Nov. 19, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/11/supreme-court-second-
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doctrinal context, the parity debate can no longer treat all constitutional 
plaintiffs alike.  Instead, what is required from the twenty-first-century 
perspective is a sensitivity to what Bator has called the “hidden 
assumption[s] of the argument”—“that the Constitution contains only one 
or two sorts of values: typically, those which protect the individual from 
the power of the state, and those which assure the superiority of federal 
to state law,” and to the “other sorts of values” that the Constitution 
contains, both granting power to the federal government and confining 
this power.136  Now more than ever, “[t]he limitations, too, count as 
setting forth constitutional values.”137  A contemporary approach to 
constitutional parity cannot stop with win rates but must look to how state 
and federal judges think about the subtle boundaries of constitutional 
rights, especially where rights come into conflict.138 
The parity debate is not singular and cannot be decided by a single 
empirical metric, no matter how robust the study design or how 
significant the results.  Rather, parity has to be assessed by recourse to a 
broad set of institutional characteristics and a similarly broad ecosystem 
of actors—as exemplified by disciplinary approaches to the study of the 
courts.139  Even if one begins by theorizing parity narrowly, it is 
impossible to proceed without drawing in factors that are equally 
applicable to broader definitions.  For example, Solimine and Walker’s 
much-criticized study, which explicitly centered outcomes as of near-
exclusive importance, had also to assess case type, right asserted, aspects 
of the case’s procedural posture, various characteristics of judges, and 
 
amendment-rights/ (prominent conservatives call to reinvigorate gun rights litigation with the hope that 
Justice Kavanaugh will be receptive to expanding the scope of the Second Amendment); see also Janus 
v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (exemplifying one of the most prominent contemporary 
cases using the First Amendment to advance a right-wing, anti-union agenda); Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns, 
Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
887 (2011). The Covid-19 pandemic has provided the latest opportunity for right-wing constitutional 
rights innovation. See, e.g., Clare Lombardo, Indiana University’s Vaccine Requirement Should Stand, 
Federal Judge Rules, NPR (July 19, 2021, 6:51 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2021/07/19/1018010489/indiana-universitys-vaccine-requirement-should-stand-
federal-judge-rules; Ilya Somin, A Takings Clause Lawsuit Against the CDC Eviction Moratorium, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 3, 2021, 10:20 PM), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/08/03/a-takings-
clause-lawsuit-against-the-cdc-eviction-moratorium/.  But see Rubenstein, supra note 42. 
 136. Bator, supra note 51, at 631–32. 
 137. Id. (emphasis removed). 
 138. In Burt Neuborne’s 1995 article Parity Revisited, Neuborne suggests that the increasing 
conservatism of the federal courts more or less puts an end to the parity debate.  Neuborne, supra note 16.  
However, this development merely shifts the terrain, generally in line with Paul Bator’s perspective on 
this point.  See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 139. But see Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate 
Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 252–53 (1997) (“To date, legal scholarship has been 
remarkably oblivious to this large and mounting body of political science scholarship on courts.  Some 
political scientists have been correspondingly unconscious of the legal model.”). 
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some strategic considerations of litigants.140  Or take Neuborne’s single 
heuristic of “judicial competence.”  Any attempt to understand the 
concept of “competence” opens out onto a host of considerations such as 
insulation from majoritarian pressure,141 prestige,142 selectiveness,143 
salary,144 time management,145 clerk quality,146 and the social classes of 
each type of judge.147  No matter the theoretical point of departure, the 
empirical assessment of parity inevitably moves toward institutional 
comparisons encompassing many parameters; the scope of such 
comparison changes only by level of scale. 
It is also critical that any empirical approach to the parity debates 
account for how different actors affect each other.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court interprets congressional statutes but also sets the tone for the kind 
of legislation Congress might consider enacting; Congress creates 
frameworks of concurrency that create the terrain on which litigants make 
strategic choices but is also subject to litigant lobbies; the Court shapes 
new law based on the experiences and arguments of individual litigants 
who come before it who may not be served well by the lived reality of the 
court systems in which their concerns are heard.  For example, one might 
ask with regard to CAFA how business litigants, in the aggregate, 
influenced Congress to make these particular allocational decisions.148 
Finally, empirical and normative considerations vary in salience to 
different actors.  As this article has shown thus far, empirics matter very 
little, in the end, to many actors—such as the U.S. Supreme Court.  The 
claim here is not that empirics put the parity debates to rest, but rather that 
they provide new ground for expanding the set of conversations around 
the comparative affordances of the state and federal courts. 
III. EVALUATING COMPARATIVE CAPACITY: DATA AND METHODS ON THE 
COURTS AS INSTITUTIONS 
This Part surveys empirical research on state and federal courts and the 
 
 140. Solimine & Walker, supra note 43, at 236–52.  See in particular, id. at 238 n.118 (listing 
thirteen coded variables).  See also supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 141. Bator, supra note 51, at 623; Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 275. 
 142. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 13, at 276; Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1120–
21. 
 143. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1121. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Bator, supra note 51, at 623; Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1121, 1124. 
 146. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1122. 
 147. Id. at 1124. 
 148. For an examination of the legislative and lobbying history of the Class Action Fairness Act, 
see, e.g., Anna Andreeva, Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: The Eight-Year Saga Is Finally Over, 59 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 385 (2005); Stephen P. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical 
Context: A Preliminary View of the Statute’s Legal Significance, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439 (2008). 
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tools and methods available to extend this research.  It also identifies 
aspects of the parity debate where the empirics really do seem intractable 
or at least not useful.  Any model of parity must identify institutional 
parameters of interest.  This Part follows Neuborne in considering judicial 
competence, “psychological set,” and attorney demographics.  Extending 
Neuborne, it adds a broader concept of judicial psychology and decision-
making and an analysis of court resources and public trust and confidence 
in the courts. 
In the attempt to review a vast literature, editorial decisions were 
inevitable.  And this Part’s working definition of “the empirical literature” 
is catholic.  Given the model of parity as a multitude of debates operating 
at different levels of scale, this Part likewise offers data right-sized to 
each, from systemic quantitative information to local case studies, 
personal reflections,  to analyses of case outcomes.  In short, it follows 
Lee Epstein and Gary King’s view of data as “just a term for facts about 
the world,” which may be “precise or vague, relatively certain or very 
uncertain, directly observed or indirect proxies, and they can be 
anthropological, interpretive, sociological, economic, legal, political, 
biological, physical, or natural.”149  In so doing, this synthesis recognizes 
some legal scholarship as “empirical” that may not self-identify as such; 
under the Epstein and King definition, most legal scholars are already 
doing empirical work.150  But the inclusion of a given study is not 
necessarily an endorsement. 
This survey mainly encompasses disciplinary empirical work on the 
courts—from political science, economics, and psychology, among 
others.  But the intended audience is primarily federal courts scholars, 
who could draw on this empirical work to make and critique the kinds of 
doctrinal and historical arguments most common in the field of federal 
courts.  The analysis begins with data on judges—the individuals within 
court systems who hold the most power and therefore draw the most 
attention—and how they do their work.  From judges themselves, we 
move to the objects and products of their labor: cases and their outcomes, 
including data on case complexity, docket composition, substantive legal 
issues, and judicial workload.  This literature, when considered 
collectively, begins to outline what Neuborne and others think of as 
“judicial competence.”151  Such data contextualize outcomes-oriented 
research. 
This Part then collects empirical data on attorneys and litigants—a 
comparatively less-studied area that is crucial to developing a proper 
 
 149. Epstein & King, supra note 83, at 2–3. 
 150. Id. at 3. 
 151. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text for a discussion of judicial competence in the 
context of the earlier parity debate. 
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empirics of the litigant-choice principle.  In furthering a more expansive 
view of the courts as institutions, this Part assesses the wide array of data 
that the state and federal court systems collect in order to monitor and 
improve their own performance.  It finishes by evaluating the place of the 
courts in the public sphere.  Such institutional metrics provide a 
foundation for what is ultimately the most important comparative 
normative project on the courts: the development of a model of court 
quality that can be applied to both state and federal courts with the aim of 
enhancing the capacity of both court systems to serve litigants, the law, 
and the public.  This Part concludes with reflections on gaps in the 
available data and practical considerations for future comparative 
research. 
A. Judges as the Central Actors and Objects of Analysis 
1. Judicial Demographics 
By far the largest body of empirical data on the courts focuses on 
judges on the assumption152 that they are the most critical players in the 
system.153  Who are judges?  Our judiciary is far less diverse than the 
communities it serves, and the full effect of this discrepancy is not yet 
known.  Though the diversity of federal judges is improving somewhat,154 
the state judiciary remains overwhelmingly white and male.155  
Comprehensive demographic information about both federal and state 
judges is readily available—in raw form,156 and accompanied by 
 
 152. An assumption that seems reasonable but is untested. 
 153. A note about the citations in Part III.A: Because the literature on judges and judicial labor is 
so vast, there is simply not space to list all the bibliographic sources this author finds relevant.  This author 
has selected those that are either most representative of the scope of the literature, most recent in time, 
most seminal, most comprehensive, or most squarely on point, with a bias toward articles appearing in 
disciplinary journals that may not be as frequently read in the legal academy, and to encourage interested 
readers to dive further into the literature. 
 154. Barry J. McMillion, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGES: PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS (2017). 
 155. TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, THE GAVEL 
GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS? 2–3 (2016), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/gavel-gap-report.pdf.  For interactive data, see  Tracey E. George and Albert H. 
Yoon, Gavel Gap, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/reports/gavel-gap/ 
(last visited Aug. 1, 2021).  
 156. See Attributes of U.S. Federal Judges Database, THE JUD. RSCH. INITIATIVE (JURI) AT THE 
UNIV. OF S.C., http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2021); 
Demography of Article III Judges, 1789–2017, FED. JUD. CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/demography-article-iii-judges-1789-2017-
introduction (last visited Aug. 1, 2021).  See also Judicial Diversity: A Resource Page, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST., https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/judicial-diversity-0, Sept. 12, 2017 (last visited Aug. 
1, 2021); Danielle Root, Jake Faleschini & Grace Oyenubi, Building a More Inclusive Federal Judiciary, 
CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts 
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sophisticated analysis.157  In particular, Tracey George and Albert Yoon’s 
groundbreaking work on the “Gavel Gap” in the state judiciary—the 
difference in diversity between a given state’s judiciary and its 
population—highlights the relationship between a judge’s identity and 
her decisions.158  The project aggregates data on every individual state 
judge, allowing for nuanced comparison.  Gender influences case 
outcomes and panel dynamics.159  And judicial nominees’ prior 
professional experience is increasingly homogeneous.160  This work 
primarily focuses on U.S. Supreme Court and federal appellate court 
appointees, but the research questions and methods could be extended to 
federal district and state court judges.  Salary information, which some 
commentators have indicated may affect whether qualified lawyers seek 
to become judges,161 is readily accessible online.162  Finally, detailed 
biographical and financial information is available in raw form via federal 
judges’ nomination papers.163 
2. Judicial Training 
The literature contains somewhat less information about how judges 
develop their substantive legal knowledge, orient their decision-making, 
and interact with others in the court system.  We know little about whether 
judicial training is effective and how it could be improved.  The question 
of training is intimately linked with the concept of judicial competence.  
 
/reports/2019/10/03/475359/building-inclusive-federal-judiciary/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2021).  But see 
Judicial Officer (JO) Demographic Data, CAL. CTS., http://www.courts.ca.gov/13418.htm (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2021). 
 157. See McMillion, supra note 154; George & Yoon, THE GAVEL GAP, supra note 155. 
 158. George & Yoon, Gavel Gap, supra note 155. 
 159. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects 
of Sex on Judging, 54 AM. J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010). 
 160. Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and 
Its Consequences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 903 (2003); Lee 
Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, & Jeffrey A. Segal, Circuit Effects: How the Norm of 
Federal Judicial Experience Biases the Supreme Court, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (2009); Benjamin H. 
Barton, An Empirical Study of Supreme Court Justice Pre-Appointment Experience, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1137 
(2012). 
 161. See supra notes 60 and 144, and accompanying text. 
 162. See Judicial Salaries: U.S. District Court Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/judicial-salaries-us-district-court-judges (last visited Aug. 8, 2021); 
Judicial Salary Tracker, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/salarytracker (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2021). 
 163. See Judicial Nominations, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/judicial (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
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The Federal Judicial Center164 and the National Center for State Courts165 
publicize information about the curricula and training programs they offer 
for sitting judges, which include everything from ethics and evidentiary 
decision-making to the practicalities of running trials and maintaining 
courtroom security.  Some of this training is oriented toward changing a 
judge’s personal affect—for example, reducing implicit bias.166 However, 
the efficacy of such interventions has been questioned.167 
3. Judicial Selection Processes and Their Effects 
The earlier parity debate often emphasized that federal judges168 are 
appointed for life, whereas state judges are often elected or subject to 
electoral recall.  Many scholars believed that elections made it hard for 
state judges to enforce federal rights, especially unpopular ones.  For 
some, the disparity between systems was so obvious as not to be worth 
discussion;169 for others, the question was live and as yet unanswered;170 
and for still others, the question was, very pragmatically, moot given state 
judges’ constitutional obligation to enforce federal law, and given that the 
vast majority of litigation in the United States takes place before state 
judges.171  Four decades later, we know that the process of judicial 
selection influences subsequent decision-making and now seek to 
understand precisely how that influence works.172  And it is understood 
that the federal appointment process, too, shapes what later happens on 
the bench.173 
 
 164. See, e.g., Programs and Resources for Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/education/programs-and-resources-judges (last visited Aug. 8, 2021); Manuals, 
Monographs, & Guides, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/education/manuals-monographs-
guides (last visited Aug. 8, 2021); see also FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ANNUAL REPORT: 2020, 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/34/Federal%20Judicial%20Center%20Annual%20Repo
rt%202020.pdf; Federal and State Court Cooperation: Effectiveness of Implicit Bias Trainings, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/content/337738/effectiveness-implicit-bias-trainings (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2021).  
 165. See, e.g., Areas of Expertise, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/Services-
and-Experts/Areas-of-expertise.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).  
 166. See Effectiveness of Implicit Bias Trainings, supra note 164. 
 167. Elizabeth Thornburg, (Un)conscious Judging, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1567 (2019). 
 168. The debate has primarily addressed Article III judges, setting aside magistrate judges, 
bankruptcy judges, ALJs, and so forth, all of whom should properly be included in any comprehensive 
study.  See Resnik, supra note 32, at 174. 
 169. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
 170. See, e.g., Herman, supra note 15. 
 171. See supra note 58 and accompanying text; see also George & Yoon, supra note 155, at 3 
(“State courts handle more than 90% of the judicial business in America.”). 
 172. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Judicial Elections, 114 MICH. L. REV. 929 
(2016). 
 173. See infra notes 191–193 and accompanying text. 
33
McBride: Parity as Comparative Capacity
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] PARITY AS COMPARATIVE CAPACITY 101 
Selection and election processes vary not only between the state and 
federal systems as a whole but among the states too. (Thus, though the 
earlier parity debate contrasted elected state judges as a group with 
appointed federal judges as a group,174 it is important to take account of 
how variations in selection and election processes among the states may 
change the nature of the comparison.)  The historical development and 
variety of state appointment and election models have been thoroughly 
mapped and analyzed.175  Judicial elections are now more visible and 
politicized than ever before.176  And there is a lively critical debate as to 
which system is best; though there is some consensus that appointed and 
life-tenured judiciaries are more independent, there are notable dissenters, 
many of whom also question whether complete independence from the 
voting public is desirable.177 
 
 174. See supra notes 28–36 and accompanying text. 
 175. For systemic data and analysis, see Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Project Overview, STATE 
SUPREME COURT DATA PROJECT, http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~pbrace/statecourt/index.html (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2021); Paul Brace & Kellie Sims Butler, New Perspectives for the Comparative Study of the 
Judiciary: The State Supreme Court Project, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 243 (2001); see also Jeff Yates, On the 
Future of State Courts Research, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 302 (2009). 
For comparative and particularized studies, see, e.g., PHILIP L. DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1980); William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, 
What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340 (1987); Melinda 
Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, Does Quality Matter? Challengers in State Supreme Court Elections, 
50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 20 (2006); Lisa M. Holmes & Jolly A. Emrey, Court Diversification: Staffing the 
State Courts of Last Resort through Interim Appointments, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 1 (2006); James L. Gibson, 
Campaigning for the Bench: The Corrosive Effects of Campaign Speech?, 42 L. & SOC. REV. 899 (2008); 
Joanna M. Shepherd, The Politics of Judicial Opposition, 166 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 88 (2010); Canes-
Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jee-Kwang Park, Judicial Independence and Retention Elections, 28 J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 211 (2012); Ryan J. Owens, Alexander Tahk, Patrick C. Wohlfarth & Amanda C. Bryan, 
Nominating Commissions, Judicial Retention, and Forward-Looking Behavior on State Supreme Courts: 
An Empirical Examination of Selection and Retention Methods, 15 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 211 (2015); 
CHRIS W. BONNEAU & DAMON M. CANN, VOTERS’ VERDICTS: CITIZENS, CAMPAIGNS, AND 
INSTITUTIONS IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015). 
  But see, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure 
of Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965 (2007). 
  These studies also have some implications for judge competence or quality, see, e.g., Stephen 
J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluation and Information Forcing: Ranking State High 
Courts and Their Judges, 58 DUKE L. J. 1313, 1319 (2009); Thomas R. Phillips, The Merits of Merit 
Selection, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 67 (2009); Floyd Feeney, Evaluating Trial Court Performance, 
12 JUST. SYS. J. 148 (1987); Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Selection and the Qualities That Make a “Good” 
Judge, 462 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 112 (1982).  
  Scholars have noted that the development of the elected judiciary is historically contingent, 
precipitated, perhaps, by economic anxiety and a desire to strengthen the power of the judiciary as against 
a corrupt legislature.  See, e.g., Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise of Judicial 
Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061 (2010).  
 176. See RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE RISING POLITICAL, FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF 
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2007); HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT 
(2015). 
 177. Compare studies arguing against judicial elections and for a greater degree of independence, 
e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. 
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Money matters—it helps to determine who is elected and how they 
decide cases.178  Voters pay attention to a small number of high-salience 
issues like crime179 and torts,180 and comparatively less attention to low-
salience issues like environmental law.181  For example, scholars report a 
direct relationship between the number of television ads aired drawing 
attention to incumbents’ decisions in criminal cases and those judges’ 
decisions in subsequent criminal cases; ads uniformly make judges 
“tougher on crime.”182  Campaign contributions from business interests 
strongly predict favorable judicial decisions.183  And these effects are 
 
L. REV. 689 (1995); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Olga Shvetsova, Comparing Judicial Selection Systems, 
10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 7 (2001); Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 43 (2003); JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: PURSUING JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN AMERICA (2012); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Judicial Elections, 
114 MICH. L. REV. 929 (2016); David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265 
(2008) with those arguing in favor of a greater degree of majoritarian responsiveness, e.g., CHRIS W. 
BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2009); Eric A. Posner, Does 
Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter? Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal Reform, 75 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 853, 855 (2008); Stephen J. Choi, G. Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Professionals or Politicians: 
The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
290, 290 (2010); Lee Epstein, Electoral Benefits: The Assault on the Assaulters of Judicial Elections, 
96 JUDICATURE 218 (2013). 
  For comparative and reflective studies of selection systems, see Larry T. Aspin & William K. 
Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306 (1994) (surveying judges who had 
faced retention elections, finding a high degree of support for the process); F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There 
a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial Independence?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 712 (2004); Lee Epstein, 
Shedding (Empirical) Light on Judicial Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 563 (2009); G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT 
FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES (2012); 
James L. Gibson, Electing Judges: Future Research and the Normative Debate About Judicial Elections, 
96 JUDICATURE 223 (2013); Lawrence Baum, Supreme Court Elections: How Much They Have Changed, 
Why They Have Changed, and What Differences It Makes, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 900 (2017). 
 178. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 625 
(2009); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical Analysis of 
Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 69 (2011). Compare Joshua B. 
Fischman, Do the Justices Vote Like Policy Makers?  Evidence from Scaling the Supreme Court with 
Interest Groups, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S269 (2015). 
 179. See Gregory A. Huber & Sanford C. Gordon, Accountability and Coercion: Is Justice Blind 
When It Runs for Office?, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI 247 (2004); Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The 
Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 107 (2007); Carlos Berdejó 
& Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Politics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal 
Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 741 (2013); Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark & Jason P. Kelly, 
Judicial Selection and Death Penalty Decisions, 108 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 23 (2014). 
 180. See, e.g., Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort 
Awards, 42 J.L. & ECON. 157 (1999). 
 181. Brandice Canes-Wrone, Tom S. Clark, & Amy Semet, Judicial Elections, Public Opinion, and 
Decisions on Lower-Salience Issues, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 672 (2018). 
 182. See JOANNA SHEPHERD & MICHAEL S. KANG, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, SKEWED 
JUSTICE: CITIZENS UNITED, TELEVISION ADVERTISING AND STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES’ 
DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES (2014), https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/reports/skewed-justice/ (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2021).  But see MELINDA GANN HALL, ATTACKING JUDGES: HOW CAMPAIGN 
ADVERTISING INFLUENCES STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015).  
 183. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts: The 
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magnified where judges run in partisan elections.184 
Elections affect more than case outcomes;185 they influence judges’ 
reasoning186 (but not necessarily writing style187) and public interactions 
with the courts.  Elections also influence the public legitimacy of the state 
court system,188 and even citizens’ litigiousness.189  The structure and 
incentives of elections also affect voting behavior and public engagement 
with the election process.190  But it is not only elected judges who are 
affected by public opinion and partisan influence.191  The political party 
of the official who appoints a judge correlates with the partisan slant of 
that judge’s decision-making.192  And appointed judges are susceptible to 
influence by outside parties.193 
The literature on judicial paths to the bench is methodologically 
sophisticated, bringing to bear quantitative techniques from political 
 
Empirical Relationship between Party Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decision Making, 44 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S161 (2015); LAWRENCE BAUM, DAVID KLEIN, & MATTHEW J. STREB, THE BATTLE FOR 
THE COURT: INTEREST GROUPS, JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (2017). 
 184. See Kang & Shepherd, Partisanship in State Supreme Courts, supra note 183; see also, e.g., 
Chris W. Bonneau & Damon M. Cann, Party Identification and Vote Choice in Partisan and Nonpartisan 
Elections, 37 POL. BEHAV. 43 (2015). 
 185. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 
169 (2009). 
 186. Paul R. Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, The Interplay of Preferences, Case Facts, Context, and 
Rules in the Politics of Judicial Choice, 59 J. POL. 1206, 1207 (1997); Brandice Canes-Wrone & Kenneth 
W. Shotts, When Do Elections Encourage Ideological Rigidity?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 273 (2007); Kirk 
A. Randazzo, Richard W. Waterman, & Michael P. Fix, State Supreme Courts and the Effects of Statutory 
Constraint: A Test of the Model of Contingent Discretion, 64 POL. RES. Q. 779 (2011). For normative 
perspectives, see, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory 
Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215 (2012).  
 187. Greg Goelzhauser & Damon M. Cann, Judicial Independence and Opinion Clarity on State 
Supreme Courts, 14 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 123 (2014). 
 188. See JAMES L. GIBSON, ELECTING JUDGES: THE SURPRISING EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNING ON 
JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY (2012). 
 189. Jeff Yates, Holley Tankersley, & Paul Brace, Assessing the Impact of State Judicial Structures 
on Citizen Litigiousness, 63 POL. RES. Q. 796 (2010). 
 190. See, e.g., Melinda Gann Hall, Voting in State Supreme Court Elections: Competition and 
Context as Democratic Incentives, 69 J. POL. 1147 (2007); Melinda Gann Hall & Chris W. Bonneau, 
Mobilizing Interest: The Effects of Money on Citizen Participation in State Supreme Court Elections, 
52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 457 (2008); Matthew J. Streb, Brian Frederick & Casey LaFrance, Voter Rolloff in a 
Low-Information Context: Evidence from Intermediate Appellate Court Elections, 37 AM. POL. RES. 644 
(2009). 
 191. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1589 (2009). 
 192. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal 
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156 (1998); Mark J. 
McKenzie, The Influence of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting Decisions in the Federal 
Courts, 65 POL. RES. Q. 799 (2012); Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush 
v. Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1411 (2016). 
 193. See, e.g., Michael A. Bailey, Brian Kamoie & Forrest Maltzman, Signals from the Tenth 
Justice: The Political Role of the Solicitor General in Supreme Court Decision Making, 49 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 72 (2005).  But see Jenna Becker Kane, Lobbying Justice(s)? Exploring the Nature of Amici Influence 
in State Supreme Court Decision Making, 17 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 251 (2017). 
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science and econometrics194 and comprising both aggregated data on the 
state courts as a whole and on individual states.195  Still, those seeking to 
understand the effect of judicial selection and election processes on parity, 
especially from the litigant or local perspective, would benefit from data 
and analysis with a granular focus on particular states. 
4. Judicial Decision-making as Process 
Empiricists have also sought to understand, from multiple disciplinary 
perspectives, the process of judicial decision-making itself—the 
influence of external factors as well as processes intrinsic to the judge.196  
This literature illuminates what was earlier called “psychological set.”  
Indeed, scholarship on judicial decision-making offers a more nuanced 
consideration of how case outcomes come to be and whether two facially 
identical outcomes are indeed  equivalent.197 
Political scientists have created a variety of models to understand the 
judicial mind.198  The attitudinal model posits that a judge evaluates the 
facts and arguments of the case before her against her preexisting attitudes 
and commitments—most often, political.199  Originally developed based 
on U.S. Supreme Court Justices, the attitudinal model has been applied to 
the state judiciary,200 allowing cross-systemic comparisons.  It has been 
 
 194. See, e.g., Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, Judging Law in Election Cases, 70 VAND. 
L. REV. 1755, 1761 (2017); Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the Preferences 
of State Supreme Court Judges, 62 J. POL. 387, 387 (2000); Brian R. Sala & James F. Spriggs, Designing 
Tests of the Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers, 57 POL. RES. Q. 197, 205 (2004); Melinda 
Gann Hall, The Controversy Over Electing Judges and Advocacy in Political Science, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 
284, 287 (2009). 
 195. Compare Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The View from 
the American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5 (1995) with, e.g., Andrew J. Clopton & C. Scott Peters, Justices 
Denied: A Count-Level Analysis of the 2010 Iowa Supreme Court Retention Election, 34 JUST. SYS. J. 321 
(2013); John D. Echeverria, State Judicial Elections and Environmental Law: Case Studies of Montana, 
North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin, 16 VT. J. ENV. L. 363 (2015). 
 196. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, 
THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1997). 
 197. See supra notes 50 (psychological set), 38–47 (outcomes literature) and accompanying text. 
 198. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783 (2003). 
 199. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL 
MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 200. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of 
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 744 (1995); Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences 
Into Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1629, 1657 (2010). 
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richly generative, sparking critiques201 and hybridizations.202  As to the 
U.S. Supreme Court in particular, a rational choice alternative has posited 
that the Justices behave, at least in part, strategically.  Rather than 
sincerely voting their preferences, judges in a rational-choice model seek 
to influence their colleagues’ votes from certiorari to the final opinion.203  
Both models explain judicial decision-making by recourse to something 
more than law itself.204  Though this research has seen a renewed 
flowering from the 1990s to the present, the strategic model of judicial 
behavior was a live area of discourse as early as the 1960s205—and thus 
would have been available to earlier parity writers. 
Empiricists have sought to understand the relationship between a 
judge’s identity and her decisions.  George and Yoon are beginning to 
explore causal relationships between various demographic parameters 
and state case outcomes.206  A few studies have examined how a judge’s 
social background influences her decisions.207 Academics believe that 
judicial ideology matters; judges often disagree.208  To some extent, this 
is a question of definitions.  Judges will openly admit, for example, to 
interpretive models, such as originalism or textualism, that are 
ideologically inflected if not necessarily partisan in their politics.209  From 
 
 201. See, e.g., Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal Theory 
and Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2008); Dona Roy & Donald R. 
Songer, Does the Attitudinal Model Explain Unanimous Reversals, 31 JUST. SYS. J. 342 (2010); Ali S. 
Masood & Donald R. Songer, Reevaluating the Implications of Decision-Making Models: The Role of 
Summary Decisions in U.S. Supreme Court Analysis, 1 J.L. & CTS. 363, 364 (2013). 
 202. Michael C. Dorf, Whose Ox Is Being Gored—When Attitudinalism Meets Federalism, 21 ST. 
JOHN’S J. L. COMMENT. 497 (2007); Paul H. Edelman, David E. Klein & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Measuring 
Deviations from Expected Voting Patterns on Collegial Courts, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 819 (2008); 
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831 (2008); Jeff Yates, 
Damon M. Cann & Brent D. Boyea, Judicial Ideology and the Selection of Disputes for U.S. Supreme 
Court Adjudication, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 847 (2013). 
 203. LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013). 
 204. See also NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW PARTISAN 
DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (2019). 
 205. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History—Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil 
Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 613 (1991); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 
(1997). 
 206. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
 207. See, e.g., Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L. 
REV. 1551 (1966); Daniel M. Schneider, Using the Social Background Model to Explain Who Wins 
Federal Appellate Tax Decisions: Do Less Traditional Judges Favor the Taxpayer, 35 VA. TAX REV. 201, 
206 (2005). 
 208. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the “Politics” of Judging: 
Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 620 (1985). 
 209. See, e.g., Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 243 
(2009); JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS (2012); Harv. L. Sch., The 2015 Scalia Lecture | A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on 
the Reading of Statutes at 8:28, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), 
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the vantage point of today’s empirical literature, Neuborne’s caution that 
allocational decisions are motivated as much by ideology as by arid 
doctrine seems common-sensical.210  The better question is how to 
measure the impact of ideology on decisions211 and the extent to which 
ideology is nakedly partisan.212 
Judges are also susceptible to the habits of mind of any human,213 
despite their efforts to overcome cognitive biases.214  Empiricists have 
described the psychology of judicial decision-making,215 using behavioral 
models,216 assessing the impact of cognitive biases on judges’ ability to 
 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dpEtszFT0Tg (recording of a November 18, 2015 interview of 
Justice Kagan as part of the Antonin Scalia Lecture Series at Harvard Law School) (“We’re all textualists 
now”).  But see Sara C. Benesh & Jason J. Czarnezki, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation, 29 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 113 (2009). 
 210. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2156–57 (1998).  See also CASS 
R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
(2006); Christina L. Boyd, Federal District Court Judge Ideology Data, http://clboyd.net/ideology.html 
(last visited May 15, 2019).  But see Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
257, 259 (2005). 
 211. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial Activism, 
91 MINN. L. REV. 1752 (2007); Joshua B. Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How 
Should We Measure It?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133 (2009); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich 
& Chris Guthrie, Judicial Politics and Decisionmaking: A New Approach, 70 VAND. L. REV. 2051, 2056–
57 (2017). 
 212. See, e.g., Stuart S. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 843 (1961); Todd Collins, Is the Sum Greater than Its Parts—Circuit Court Composition and 
Judicial Behaviour in the Courts of Appeals, 32 LAW & POL’Y 434 (2010). 
 213. Chad M. Oldfather, Judges as Humans: Interdisciplinary Research and the Problems of 
Institutional Design, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 125 (2007). 
 214. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does 
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009); Victor D. 
Quintanilla, Judicial Mindsets: The Social Psychology of Implicit Theories and the Law, 90 NEB. L. REV. 
611 (2012); Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Implicit Bias in Judicial Decision Making: How 
It Affects Judgment and What Judges Can Do About It, in ENHANCING JUSTICE, REDUCING BIAS (Sarah 
E. Redfield, ed. 2017); Justin D. Levinson, Mark W. Bennett & Koichi Hioki, Judging Implicit Bias: A 
National Empirical Study of Judicial Stereotypes, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2017); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & 
Andrew Wistrich, Gains, Losses, and Judges: Framing and the Judiciary, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 521 
(2018); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, supra note 167.  
 215. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making, 46 CAN. B. REV. 406 (1968); 
James W. Witt, The Bases of Judicial Decision-Making: The Need for a Reappraisal, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 
551 (1976); Shari Seidman Diamond, The Challenges of Socio-Legal Research on Decision Making: 
Psychological Successes and Failures, 22 J.L. & SOC’Y 78 (1995); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
& Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227 (2006); 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-up versus Top-down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2006); Shari S. 
Diamond, The Psychology of the Decision-Making Process, 17 ASIAN DISP. REV. 197 (2015). 
 216. See, e.g., THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Nancy Maveety ed., 2003); Stephen J. Choi 
& G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 
87 (2008); Lee Epstein et al., Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior, in IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, 
& LAW (Jon Hanson ed., 2012); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Reconsidering Judicial Preferences, 16 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI. 11 (2013); Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & 
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deal impartially with the facts—and litigants—before them,217 and tracing 
how subtle and often unconscious influences like intuition,218 emotion,219 
and heuristics220 sway decisions.221  Like other humans, judges are 
influenced by those around them.  Sophisticated analyses of the social 
dynamics of judicial panels have illuminated everything from when en 
banc review is granted222 to when and how stridently judges choose to 
dissent.223 
Judges also rely on the law—the extent to which is debated—in making 
their decisions.  Empiricists have traced how doctrine itself, in 
combination with other factors, shapes judicial decision-making,224 in 
part through studying the uniformity of interpretation of federal statutes225 
 
MARY L. REV. 2017 (2016). 
 217. See Richard E. Redding & N. Dickon Reppucci, Effects of Lawyers’ Socio-political Attitudes 
on Their Judgments of Social Science in Legal Decision Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 31 (1999); 
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts, 
84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie, & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Can Judges 
Ignore Inadmissible Information: The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 
(2005); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial 
Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117 (2009); Emma Cunliffe, Judging, Fast and Slow: Using 
Decision-Making Theory to Explore Judicial Fact Determination, 18 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 139 
(2014)); John B. Meixner & Shari Seidman Diamond, The Hidden Daubert Factor: How Judges Use Error 
Rates in Assessing Scientific Evidence, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1063, 1067 (2014). 
 218. See, e.g., R. George Wright, The Role of Intuition in Judicial Decisionmaking, 42 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1381 (2006). 
 219. See Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, 
and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313, 318–20 (2012); Adam N. Glynn & Maya Sen, 
Identifying Judicial Empathy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 37 (2015). 
 220. See Craig E. Jones, The Troubling New Science of Legal Persuasion: Heuristics and Biases in 
Judicial Decision-Making, 41 ADVOC. Q. 49 (2013). 
 221. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: 
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 222. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 
74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 213 (1999). 
 223. Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Comparing Attitudinal 
and Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 123, 
123 (2004); Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A 
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 109 (2011); see also Pauline T. Kim, 
Deliberation and Strategy on the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel 
Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1319 (2009). 
 224. See Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, What Is Legal Doctrine?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 517, 
517 (2006); Jeffrey R. Lax, Constructing Legal Rules on Appellate Courts, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 591 
(2007); Tonja Jacobi & Emerson H. Tiller, Legal Doctrine and Political Control, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
326 (2007); Jeffrey R. Lax & Kelly T. Rader, Legal Constraints on Supreme Court Decision Making: Do 
Jurisprudential Regimes Exist?, 72 J. POL. 273 (2010); MICHAEL A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, 
THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011); Jeffrey R. Lax, 
The New Judicial Politics of Legal Doctrine, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 131 (2011); Scott Baker & Pauline 
T. Kim, A Dynamic Model of Doctrinal Choice, 4 J.L. ANALYSIS 329 (2012); Jeffrey R. Lax, Political 
Constraints on Legal Doctrine: How Hierarchy Shapes the Law, 74 J. POL. 765 (2012). 
 225. See, e.g., Todd E. Thompson, Increasing Uniformity and Capacity in the Federal Appellate 
System, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457 (1984); Christopher A. Cotropia, Arising Under Jurisdiction and 
Uniformity in Patent Law, 9 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253 (2003); Jason J. Czarnezki, An 
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and state and lower federal courts’ compliance with U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent.226  For example: Politically unified appellate panels “deferred 
to the agency [under Chevron] only 33% . . . of the time when the policy 
outcomes that would have resulted from adhering to doctrine appeared 
inconsistent with the panel’s political preferences,” but in the “presence 
of a whistleblower,” it is “almost twice as likely that doctrine will be 
followed when doctrine works against the partisan policy preferences of 
the court majority.”227  And state courts are, contrary to expectations, 
compliant with U.S. Supreme Court precedent in criminal confession 
cases, but “are evidently slightly less compelled than the circuit courts to 
make certain decisions as a consequence of the factual configuration of 
the case under consideration,” meaning that “due process protections . . . 
 
Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine 
in Environmental Law, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 767 (2008); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect: An 
Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008); 
Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the Circuit 
Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315 (2011); Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower 
Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53 (2015); Richard M. Re, 
Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921 (2016); Amy Semet, Specialized 
Trial Courts in Patent Litigation: A Review of the Patent Pilot Program’s Impact on Appellate Reversal 
Rates at the Five-Year Mark, 60 B.C. L. REV. 519 (2019).  But see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 
94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1639 (2008). 
 226. See, e.g., Richard M. Johnson, Compliance and Supreme Court Decision-Making, 1967 WIS. 
L. REV. 170 (1967); Lawrence Baum, Lower-Court Response to Supreme Court Decisions: Reconsidering 
a Negative Picture, 3 JUST. SYS. J. 208 (1978); John Gruhl, Anticipatory Compliance with Supreme Court 
Rulings, 14 POLITY 294 (1981); Charles A. Johnson, Do Lower Courts Anticipate Changes in Supreme 
Court Policies—A Few Empirical Notes, 3 LAW & POL’Y Q. 55 (1981); James L. Gibson, Institutional 
Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: A Question of Causality, 
25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1991); James F. Spriggs II, Explaining Bureaucratic Compliance with 
Supreme Court Opinions, 50 POL. RES. Q. 567 (1997); Malia Reddick & Sara C. Benesh, Norm Violation 
by the Lower Courts in the Treatment of Supreme Court Precedent: A Research Framework, 21 JUST. 
SYS. J. 117 (2000); Sara C. Benesh & Malia Reddick, Overruled: An Event History Analysis of Lower 
Court Reaction to Supreme Court Alteration of Precedent, 64 J. POL. 534 (2002); Frank Cross, Appellate 
Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. EMP. L. STUD. 369 (2005); Jeffrey K. Staton & Georg Vanberg, The 
Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 504 (2008); Pamela 
Corley, Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality Opinions, 37 AM. POL. 
RES. 30 (2009); Sara C. Benesh & Wendy L. Martinek, Context and Compliance: A Comparison of State 
Supreme Courts and the Circuits, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 795 (2009); Jennifer K. Luse, Geoffrey McGovern, 
Wendy L. Martinek & Sara C. Benesh, Such Inferior Courts: Compliance by Circuits with Jurisprudential 
Regimes, 37 AM. POL. RES. 75 (2009); Chad Westerland, Jeffrey A. Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. 
Cameron, & Scott Camparato, Strategic Defiance and Compliance in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 54 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 891 (2010); Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, The Citation and Depreciation of U.S. 
Supreme Court Precedent, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 325 (2013); Sara C. Benesh, Jennifer K. 
Jacobson, Amanda Schaefer & Nicole Simmons, Supreme Court GVRs and Lower-Court Reactions, 
35 JUST. SYS. J. 162 (2014); Joseph L. Smith & James A. Todd, Rules, Standards, and Lower Court 
Decisions, 3 J.L. & CTS. 257 (2015); Yosh Halberstam, Trial and Error: Decision Reversal and Panel 
Size in State Courts, 32 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 94 (2016); Michael P. Fix, Justin T. Kingsland, & Matthew 
D. Montgomery, The Complexities of State Court Compliance with U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 
38 JUST. SYS. J. 149 (2017).  But see Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 
442 (2007). 
 227. Cross & Tiller, supra note 192, at 2172. 
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are not uniformly enforced across the judicial system.”228  Federal judges 
deciding state law questions rely to some extent on the decision-making 
of state supreme court justices via certification.229  Some work calibrates 
the influence of doctrine and other considerations like politics, identity 
categories, or implicit biases on, say, the harshness of criminal 
sentencing.230  This literature provides point and counterpoint to 
Neuborne’s contention that the Burger Court’s jurisdictional decisions 
were politicized, informed more by docket paranoia and distaste for 
particular kinds of litigants than by the law itself.231  Judges are also 
influenced by social pressures in combination with doctrine—for 
example, appellate judges’ reversal decisions depend in part on the law 
and in part on the race of the lower court judge;232 lower court judges base 
their decisions both on their conception of the law and on a desire to avoid 
reversal and its emotional and reputational costs.233  Law matters, but so 
do personality, politics, and social context.234 
5. Judicial Working Conditions 
This Section considers the empirical information available on how 
judges work—what one might see if one could shadow a judge in her 
daily tasks.  Of course, most judges have people who do just that: 
clerks.235  Earlier writers on parity identified clerks as important for 
several reasons.  Clerks extend a judge’s ability to complete work, and 
thus judges who are allotted more clerks functionally have more time to 
devote to each case.  Clerks’ research, writing, and analysis capabilities 
 
 228. Benesh & Martinek, Context and Compliance, supra note 226, at 817. 
 229. See Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State Law to State 
Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEG. 157, 161 (2003). 
 230. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuter, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal 
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85 (2005); Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of 
Review Matter? The Case of Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 405 (2011); Joshua 
B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The 
Role of Judicial Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 729, 729 (2012); Jesse-
Justin Cuevas & Tonja Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161 (2016). 
 231. Neuborne, supra note 6, at 1117–18. 
 232. Maya Sen, Is Justice Really Blind?  Race and Reversal in U.S. Courts, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S187 (2015). 
 233. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want?  
An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 518 (2012); Alma Cohen, 
Alon Klement & Zvika Neeman, Judicial Decision Making: A Dynamic Reputation Approach, 44 J. 
LEGAL STUD. S133 (2015). 
 234. This fact seems to support the realist outlook of earlier writers on parity.  See, e.g., Neuborne, 
supra note 6, at 1106. 
 235. See, e.g., Albert Yoon, Law Clerks and the Institutional Design of the Federal Judiciary, 
98 MARQ. L. REV. 131 (2014). 
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help determine the range of considerations a judge will contemplate as 
she reasons through a case; clerks may even advocate for particular 
interpretations of the law.236  Some work has sought to trace and collect 
the personal experiences of clerks, especially those employed by U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, both for descriptive purposes and in an attempt 
to trace clerk influence.237 More recently, empiricists have identified 
clerks as valuable data points possibly indicating judges’ views.238  For 
example, clerks’ political leanings are correlated with the ideologies of 
the judges for whom they work; for judges with unknown ideologies, 
then, clerk data is tempting.239  Such data is hard to come by, which 
perhaps explains the reliance on the relatively prominent U.S. Supreme 
Court clerks in such research.240 Clerks are also judicial actors in their 
own right, supporting their judge’s work and, perhaps, influencing her 
perspective.241  Some empiricists have even gone so far recently as to 
compare the influence of law clerks over judges’ decisions to that of 
Rasputin over the Romanovs.242  And the focus on clerks naturally invites 
the as yet unasked and unanswered question of how other court 
employees, such as legal assistants or courtroom deputies, may influence 
 
 236. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 51; Neuborne, supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 237. See, e.g., ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS’ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF 
LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006); Paul R. Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of 
an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (1973); Zachary Wallander & Sara C. Benesh, Law Clerks as 
Advisors: A Look at the Blackmun Papers, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 43 (2014). 
 238. See Lawrence Baum, Hiring Supreme Court Law Clerks: Probing the Ideological Linkage 
Between Judges and Justices, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 333 (2014); Kyle Rozema, Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, 
Jacob Goldin & Maya Sen, The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 97 (2017); 
Kyle Rozema, Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacob Goldin & Maya Sen, Measuring Judicial Ideology 
Using Law Clerk Hiring, 19 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 129 (2017). 
 239. Rozema et al., The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks, supra note 238, at 124. 
 240. For aggregated data on clerks, see Law Clerk Hiring Historical Statistics, OSCAR, 
https://oscar.uscourts.gov/oscar_data (last visited Aug. 8, 2021); NALP, COURTING CLERKSHIPS: THE 
NALP JUDICIAL CLERKSHIP STUDY (2000), https://www.nalp.org/courtingclerkships (last visited Aug. 8, 
2021); A Demographic Profile of Judicial Clerks—2006 to 2016, NALP (Oct. 2017), 
https://www.nalp.org/1017research.  See, e.g., Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends—Supreme Court Law Clerks 
on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & POL. 33 (2004) (emphasis on Supreme Court clerks).  
 241. See TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006); David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role 
of Law Clerks in the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947 (2007); Todd C. Peppers & Christopher 
Zorn, Law Clerk Influence on Supreme Court Decision Making: An Empirical Assessment, 58 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 51, 53 (2008); Rick A. Swanson & Stephen L. Wasby, Good Stewards: Law Clerk Influence in State 
High Courts, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 24 (2008); Scott Armstrong, Supreme Court Clerks as Judicial Actors and 
as Sources, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 387 (2014); Ryan C. Black, Christina L. Boyd & Amanda C. Bryan, 
Revisiting the Influence of Law Clerks on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Agenda-Setting Process, 98 MARQ. 
L. REV. 75 (2014); Todd C. Peppers, Michael W. Giles & Bridget Tainer-Parkins, Surgeons or Scribes: 
The Role of United States Court of Appeals Law Clerks in “Appellate Triage,” 98 MARQ. L. REV. 313 
(2014); Christopher D. Kromphardt, U.S. Supreme Court Law Clerks as Information Sources, 3 J.L. & 
COURTS 277, 278–80 (2015). 
 242. Kyle Rozema, Adam Bonica, Adam Chilton, Jacob Goldin & Maya Sen, Legal Rasputins?  
Law Clerk Influence on Voting at the U.S. Supreme Court, 35 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (2019). 
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judges’ work processes. 
The federal and state courts themselves have been energetic in 
gathering data and developing metrics that enable observers to understand 
core questions about judicial labor.  Quantitative data describe and 
analyze the state and federal courts’ workloads at every level of 
granularity from individual states and federal circuits up through 
aggregated data on the system as a whole,243 including type of claim 
brought;244 judges’ caseloads, weighted for complexity;245 and case 
dispositions.246  By compiling these data into workload assessments, court 
systems can better manage caseloads and assess the need for additional 
personnel.247  Thus, the federal and state courts have both provided the 
data and created the kinds of metrics called for in earlier conversations on 
parity.248 
 
 243. See, e.g., State Court Organization, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://bjs.ojp.gov/data-
collection/census-state-court-organization#documentation-0 (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).  Compare 
Research, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (compiling and 
making available data for analysis, such as the Integrated Database (IDB) of all federal cases filed since 
1970), and Integrated Database (IDB), FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2021) with Matthew Kleiman, Cynthia G. Lee, & Brian J. Ostrom, Workload Assessment: A Data-
driven Management Tool for the Judicial Branch, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (2013), 
https://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/ctadmin/id/2088.   
  The Court Statistics Project collects and analyzes data on all 50 states’ courts.  See NCSC 
Analysis, COURT STAT. PROJECT, https://www.courtstatistics.org/ncsc-analysis (last visited Aug. 8, 2021); 
see also R. Schauffler, R. LaFountain, S. Strickland, K. Holt & K. Genthon, eds., Interactive Data 
Displays, COURT STAT. PROJECT, https://www.courtstatistics.org/court-statistics/interactive-caseload-
data-displays (last visited Aug. 8, 2021); S. Strickland, R. Schauffler, R. LaFountain & K. Holt, eds., State 
Court Organization Data, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/sco/data (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2021). 
 244. See, e.g., PAULA HANNAFORD-AGOR, COURT STAT., THE LANDSCAPE OF CIVIL LITIGATION 
IN STATE COURTS: EXAMINING DEBT COLLECTION, LANDLORD/TENANT AND SMALL CLAIMS CASES, 
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0027/53658/ 
caseload-highlights.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).  
 245. See Judicial Business of the United States Courts, U.S. COURTS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2021); Court Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/Services-
and-Experts/Areas-of-expertise/Court-statistics.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2021).  For historical context on 
the federal caseload data available, see History of Federal Caseload Reporting, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 
https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/history-federal-caseload-reporting (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 246. Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/analysis-reports/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (federal courts); 
Interactive Data Displays, supra note 243 (state courts). 
 247. See, e.g., Workload Assessment, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
https://www.ncsc.org/services-and-experts/areas-of-expertise/workload-assessment (last visited Aug. 8, 
2021). 
 248. See supra note 145 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., INDIANA JUDICIAL BRANCH, 
Weighted Caseload Measures, https://www.in.gov/judiciary/iocs/3330.htm (last visited May 10, 2019).  
But see Sheppard, supra note 216 (effect of time pressure on judicial decision-making).  
44
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/2
112 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
B. Litigant Characteristics and Behaviors 
Though we know quite a lot about judges and their work, we know 
relatively less about the attorneys and litigants who appear before them.  
The empirical data here are patchy and generally too aggregated to be 
useful comparatively.  We know quite a bit about the practice of forum-
shopping, especially with regard to patent and asbestos litigation.249  From 
a parity perspective, we can infer that attorneys and litigants forum-shop 
because they perceive a meaningful difference between fora.250  Case-
type data tells us something about litigants: for example, the federal courts 
track prisoner, habeas, and pro se litigation.251  Litigant and attorney 
identity, especially in disputes with a partisan valence, seems to matter to 
outcomes;252 quality of advocacy, to the extent it can be measured, may 
not.253 
Broad demographic statistics about the legal profession are available 
from the American Bar Association and others.254  Unfortunately, these 
are neither causal nor localized enough to make meaningful comparison 
between attorneys working primarily in state as opposed to federal 
practice, for example, as suggested by earlier parity commentators.255  
 
 249. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001); Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation: Procedural 
Innovations and Forum Shopping, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (2006); James E. Pfander, Forum Shopping 
and the Infrastructure of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 355, 359 (2008); Scott E. Atkinson, 
Alan C. Marco & John L. Turner, The Economics of Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, 
and the Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411 (2009); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum 
Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481 (2011); William H. J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the 
Effect of Shady Grove v. Allstate on Forum Shopping in the New York Courts, 10 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 
151 (2013). 
 250. See, e.g., Victor E. Flango, Attorneys’ Perspectives on Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 
25 AKRON L. REV. 41 (1991). 
 251. See, e.g., Judicial Business 2018, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-
reports/judicial-business-2018 (last accessed Aug. 8, 2021); see also Mitchell Levy, Comment, Empirical 
Patterns of Pro Se Litigation in Federal District Courts, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1819 (2018). 
 252. See, e.g., Kyle C. Kopko, Litigant Partisan Identity and Challenges to Campaign Finance 
Policies: An Examination of U.S. District Court Decisions, 1971–2007, 36 JUST. SYS. J. 212 (2015); 
Adam Feldman, Who Wins in the Supreme Court: An Examination of Attorney and Law Firm Influence, 
100 MARQ. L. REV. 429, 434 (2016). 
 253. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 
9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 51, 73 (2010); Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ 
Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571 (2013); Adam Feldman, Counting on Quality: The 
Effects of Merits Brief Quality on Supreme Court Decisions, 94 DENV. L. REV. 43 (2016); Emily S. Taylor 
Poppe & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Do Lawyers Matter: The Effect of Legal Representation in Civil Disputes, 
43 PEPP. L. REV. 881 (2016).  But see, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert, Inadequate Defense Counsel: An Empirical 
Analysis of Prisoners’ Perceptions, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1979); Marcus T. Boccaccini & Stanley L. 
Brodsky, Characteristics of the Ideal Criminal Defense Attorney from the Client’s Perspective: Empirical 
Findings and Implications for Legal Practice, 25 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 81, 104 (2001). 
 254. See Legal Profession Statistics, AM. BAR ASS’N (AUG. 5, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba/profession_statistics/. 
 255. See Flango, supra note 54, at 973. 
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One longitudinal sociological and ethnographic study on the Chicago 
bar256 provides an example of what would be necessary to explore the 
comparative empirical questions that Neuborne and others had in mind—
whether, for example, there are subtle local hierarchies of status and 
education between attorneys who practice primarily in state court versus 
those who practice primarily in federal court. 
Such data might enrich the litigant-choice principle advanced by 
Chemerinsky and others.  Thicker information could reveal how and why 
litigants make choices, the impact that litigant choices have on other 
actors in the system—particularly judges—and the relationship between 
such impact and case outcomes.  For this reason, and because litigants and 
counsel are the most numerous categories of court-system actors, 
additional empirical work in this realm would be helpful. 
C. Empirical Reflexivity in the Court Systems 
Our nation’s court systems regularly deploy data in service of their own 
improvement.  The federal courts are required by statute257 to collect and 
report on a wide array of data points.258  The state courts are not uniformly 
required to do this, but the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) acts 
as a clearinghouse for such information and marshals it in service of state 
court improvement.259  The NCSC’s workload assessment, and the 
Federal Judicial Center’s caseload metrics for example, are designed to 
enable court administrators to ask their respective legislatures for 
additional judges and resources.260  CourTools has created a set of metrics 
to assess trial court performance261 which could easily be applied in 
service of the parity question.  Federal courts hearing habeas or abstention 
claims might even be able to make use of such information, if briefed, in 
understanding the quality of justice available in the relevant state court. 
In short, the courts have understood the uses of empirics for self-
improvement262 and for making the case for financial and human 
 
 256. JOHN P. HEINZ, ROBERT L. NELSON, REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, 
URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (2005). 
 257. Federal Judicial Center Statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 620–629 (1992). 
 258. See supra notes 243–247 and accompanying text. 
 259. About Us, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/about-us (last visited Aug. 
8, 2021). 
 260. See supra notes 243–247; see also 28 U.S.C § 620(b)(2). 
 261. Trial Court Performance Measures, COURTOOLS, https://www.courtools.org/trial-court-
performance-measures (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 262. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federaljudiciary_strategicplan2020.pdf; see also FED. JUD. 
CTR., Research, supra note 243; About Us, supra note 259; see also David F. Levi & Mitu Gulati, Judging 
Measures, 77 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 381 (2008); Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical 
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resources263 to the legislative and executive branches.  The state courts in 
particular have heeded Bator’s call: because they hold such responsibility 
under our current allocational model (no matter what one thinks of this 
arrangement from a normative perspective), they had better perform their 
role as well as possible.264 
D. Establishing Comparative Benchmarks 
The question of parity between state and federal courts must also be 
situated with respect to two other comparative questions: First, are the 
federal courts really the gold standard?  Second, how do U.S. courts 
compare with the courts of other countries?  International rule-of-law 
rankings place the United States lower than one might hope.265  The 
American public similarly has a not entirely favorable view of the 
courts.266  Indeed, improving the American public’s perceptions of and 
trust in the court system is a major strategic goal of the federal courts.267  
Unlawful corruption is a problem, particularly in certain states.268  
“Lawful corruption,” or the various means by which special interests are 
permitted to influence litigation outcomes,269 is a much bigger problem.270  
 
Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1745 (2008). 
 263. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 262, at 24; Budget Resource Center, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/information-and-resources/budget-resource-center (last visited 
Aug. 8, 2021).  
 264. Bator, supra note 51, at 624. 
 265. WORLD JUST. PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020 (2020), 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP-ROLI-2020-Online_0.pdf.  The United 
States’ overall ranking is 21.  Most concerningly, it is one of the 25 previously-stable countries whose 
rule of law is declining.  WORLD JUST. PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2020 INSIGHTS 14 (2020), 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP%20Insights%202020%20-
%20Online%20.pdf. 
 266. In 2019, sixty-five percent of Americans had at least some confidence in state courts —a 
twelve percent decrease from the previous year.  Confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court also declined 
from 2018 but to a lesser extent (four percent).  See GBA STRATEGIES, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
2019 STATE OF THE STATE COURTS—SURVEY ANALYSIS 2 (2019), 
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/16731/sosc_2019_survey_analysis_2019.pdf.  But see 
Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision Making, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 709 (2011). 
 267. Issue 2: Preserving Public Trust, Confidence, and Understanding, U.S. COURTS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/issue-7-enhancing-public-understanding-trust-and-
confidence (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 268. Oguzhan Dincer & Michael Johnston, Measuring Illegal and Legal Corruption in American 
States: Some Results from the Corruption in America Survey, HARV. UNIV. EDMOND J. SAFRA CTR. FOR 
ETHICS (Dec. 1, 2014), https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/measuring-illegal-and-legal-corruption-american-
states-some-results-safra. 
 269. See supra notes 172–195 and accompanying text. 
 270. See Dincer & Johnston, supra note 268; see also Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and 
Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1385 (2013).  But see Stratos Pahis, Corruption in 
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Ultimately, the comparative capacity project must point not only to which 
court system is “better” for a given purpose, but also to how both the state 
and federal courts can be improved. 
E. Empirical Lacunae 
Though the parity debate can never be answered conclusively, the 
wealth of data available on the courts provides many avenues for 
exploration and argument.  There is an imbalance between state and 
federal data—far more is available on the federal courts.  What’s more, 
the metrics used for each system often differ, making comparison harder.  
But because both court systems have made such progress in developing 
metrics and analytics, it is conceptually straightforward to continue 
developing information on both court systems in parallel. 
The scale and aggregation of the data that exist also makes it somewhat 
difficult to grasp local variability.  Even where data are available on all 
fifty states,271 it seems likely there could still be substantial differences 
from one to another.  Some of these gaps might be filled with more 
qualitative, granular research such as ethnographies.  But these would 
have to be carefully conceived and designed to be both particularized and 
generalizable, given that it is impossible to do qualitative work on every 
court in the country.  Indeed, though filling the gaps in the comparative 
data set is not conceptually difficult, it would require a substantial 
infusion of both human and financial resources.  Nonetheless, the 
conceptual clarity means that those able to pursue such studies face few 
problems of research design. 
Finally, there are still areas where good data may remain elusive.  
Despite groundbreaking advances in the psychological study of judges 
and clerks’ willingness to share their experiences, it seems unlikely that 
academe will ever fully crack open the black box of real-world judicial 
decision-making.  Modeling the quality of attorneys, beyond imperfect 
proxies like education and years of experience, seems too subjective to be 
useful.  And even where data are available, they may be unusable for 
certain purposes at scale.  For example, though nationwide comparisons 
of the state and federal caseloads are available, they do not necessarily 
tell the U.S. Supreme Court where to send one type of case or another and 
why.  Some questions remain in the sphere of the normative. 
 
Our Courts: What It Looks Like and Where It Is Hidden, 118 YALE L.J. 1900 (2009). 
 271. COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, National Overview, https://www.courtstatistics.org/ncsc-
analysis/national-overview (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
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IV. CONCLUSION: A NEW COMPARATIVE CONVERSATION 
The earlier parity debate stalled because it concerned itself almost 
exclusively with allocation and, implicitly, with trying to persuade the 
U.S. Supreme Court to change its allocational jurisprudence.  It critiqued 
the Court for affirming a strong-parity model when in fact the Court did 
not base its decisions on any kind of parity claim, much less one of 
fungibility.  But federal courts scholars can find new ways into thinking 
about the comparative capacities of the state and federal courts by making 
use of the wealth of empirical research that has since emerged.  This 
Article also proposes empirical interventions for other decisionmakers—
such as legislators, litigants, and federal district judges. 
Empirics about the courts may or may not matter much to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  Indeed, it is hard to see how the Justices could make 
good use of empirical evidence of such a wide and diverse system even if 
they wanted to do so.  But facts are relevant to the hundreds of federal 
judges, thousands of state judges, and millions of attorneys and litigants 
who comprise our nation’s court systems, and to the legislators who are 
tasked with resourcing the courts—and to the critics and policy thinkers 
whose role is to suggest new ways forward.  These actors may not be able 
to control the allocation of entire classes of cases, but they influence the 
cases they touch directly and may base their decisions—where to file, 
whether to abstain, how to argue or decide a habeas claim—on knowledge 
of the courts in their ambit. 
Future additions to the parity debate could most productively make use 
of empirical data in the kinds of hot spots where the question of 
comparison between the state and federal courts becomes most 
relevant.272  Parity hot spots emerge where allocational doctrine enables 
concurrency between the state and federal courts, or contemplates federal 
courts stepping in where state courts can be said to be inadequate in some 
way, and where conditions of fact make the choice of forum particularly 
salient.  This conclusion plays out three such case studies and then opens 
onto a broader, empirically-informed parity debate. 
First, and most importantly, we can all participate in the project of 
helping the courts to attain the highest degree of competence possible.  
Bator is right: regardless of one’s normative priors, “[i]t is not enough to 
assert that the federal forum may be the more hospitable forum; we must 
also create conditions for assuring that the state courts will become a more 
hospitable forum, that the rhetoric of parity becomes a reality.”273  Rather 
 
 272. See supra notes 127–138 and accompanying text. 
 273. Bator, supra note 51, at 624. 
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than debating how to allocate millions of cases274 among a finite judicial 
workforce,275 both systems, but particularly the state courts, appear to 
require an infusion of resources.  Allocational doctrine in the twentieth 
and twenty-first centuries has suffered from a sort of “docket paranoia,” 
particularly with regard to the federal courts, which has resulted in calls 
to abolish diversity jurisdiction and the significant curtailment of federal 
jurisdiction over § 1983 and habeas claims among others.276  But the 
federal courts hear less than ten percent of all cases filed in the United 
States.277  The federal judiciary may well be overworked; that does not 
mean, however, that the state courts can take on more cases. 
It is up to legislators to direct resources to state courts.  State 
legislatures, of course, need only decide to spend more money on their 
courts.  But the U.S. Congress should also consider granting money to the 
states for this purpose.  Congress could simply decide that the adequacy 
of state courts is a compelling national interest that deserves funding in 
its own right.  But to the extent that Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court 
feel that parts of the federal docket should be shifted to the states, the 
federal government may, according to some readings, be strongly advised 
to provide funding to facilitate this shift.  On one hand, the Constitution 
provides both that the state courts are legally sufficient to handle all 
federal judicial business,278 and that the state courts have the “power and 
duty” to hear federal claims, under the Supremacy Clause.279  On the other 
hand, a state could argue that the federal government is improperly 
commandeering its courts to handle what is a federal responsibility.280  
 
 274. In 2016, the last year for which aggregated data is available, 84.2 million cases were filed in 
state courts.  See COURT STAT. PROJECT, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD 
DIGEST: 2016 DATA 1 (2018), 
https://www.courtstatistics.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/23897/sccd_2016.pdf. In 2019, 376,762 cases 
were filed in the federal district courts.  See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2019, U.S. COURTS, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2019 (last visited Aug. 8, 
2021). 
 275. For example, in the twelve-month period ending June 30, 2020, each federal district judge 
carried an average of 885 pending cases.  See U.S. COURTS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS—
NATIONAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE 1 (2020), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/fcms_na_distprofile0630.2020.pdf. 
 276. See supra note 6. 
 277. George & Yoon, Gavel Gap, supra note 155. 
 278. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1. 
 279. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 390 (1947). 
 280. The federal government may not “commandeer” “state officers to execute federal laws.”  
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997).  Any federal law of sufficient scope to provide 
meaningful assistance to the state courts in discharging their duties to hear federal cases might be cast as 
the kind of compulsion of “state officials to administer a federal regulatory program” disavowed in Printz.  
Id. at 936.  But the Printz Court suggests a way forward for cooperative federalism, following “Hamilton’s 
statement in The Federalist No. 36 . . . that the Federal Government would in some circumstances do well 
‘to employ the State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union by an accumulation of 
their emoluments’—which surely suggests inducing state officers to come aboard by paying them, rather 
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And practically speaking, it may be politically infeasible to add many 
more cases to state dockets without providing additional resources.  
Theoretically, state courts should not require any compensation or 
incentive to hear any number of federal claims.281  But out of fairness to 
the states, and out of a desire to ensure robust and fair adjudication of all 
claims, policymakers may choose to draw on the commandeering 
analysis. 
Second, judicial actors other than the U.S. Supreme Court might 
engage empirical information.  Both scholars and litigants should 
consider how they might direct mixed normative and empirical arguments 
toward these decisionmakers, particularly in the areas of abstention and 
habeas.  Abstention doctrine relies heavily on the rhetoric of equity, 
leaving substantial room for federal district judges to exercise their “wise 
discretion” and “considerations of wise judicial administration” in 
choosing whether to keep the case.282  Federal district judges could 
consider a wide array of data points about the particular state court in 
question, to determine whether a given case is one of the rare instances 
when abstention is appropriate.283  Some of these may be issues of law: 
for example, Pullman directs a district court to consider whether the 
relevant state’s law “appears to furnish easy and ample means” for 
deciding the question, such as certification.284  A court might also 
consider the scope and adequacy of a state’s procedural law.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court took such considerations into account in Mitchum v. 
Foster, noting, after reviewing Reconstruction-era history, that § 1983 
was enacted against the backdrop of Congress’ concern that “state 
instrumentalities could not protect” federal constitutional rights.285 
But a district court need not be limited to law.  A litigant could brief 
the issue by recourse to data about the particular state court’s track record, 
attempting to make or rebut a “showing that . . . obvious methods for 
securing a definitive ruling in the state courts cannot be pursued with full 
protection of the constitutional claim.”286  Such data might include 
information about the capacity of the state court as compared with the 
federal court: the amount of time it will take to decide the case; data on 
any discrepancy in win rates for the given type of claim, along with any 
 
than merely commandeering their official services.”  Id. at 914.  It is certainly in the spirit of Printz, if not 
required by its letter, for the federal government to make significant grants to the state courts in support 
of their duty and capacity to hear federal claims and enforce federal rights. 
 281. Testa, 330 U.S. at 391. 
 282. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 645 (1941); Colo. River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (quotations omitted). 
 283. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817. 
 284. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 645. 
 285. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242. 
 286. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 645. 
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potential explanations for this discrepancy, such as a tendency of elected 
judges to decide against that type of litigant; a strong likelihood of 
implicit bias by judges against litigants of the same demographic; and, 
following Colorado River’s exhortation to “conserv[e] judicial 
resources,” a consideration of the impact of that single case, or class of 
cases, on the state’s court system as compared with the local federal 
courts.287 
And because federal courts are to abstain only rarely under conditions 
of concurrency,288 empirical data situating the case among other similar 
conflicts would also help the court to determine, for example, whether the 
case “bear[s] on policy problems of substantial public import,” or whether 
the state has a “coherent policy” on point and the precise extent to which 
the case at issue would disturb that policy—in essence, determining 
whether the case is truly, verifiably exceptional.289  Lower courts have 
broad discretion in making abstention determinations, with very little 
doctrine to guide the decision.  Comparative capacity empirics can help 
litigants and courts to fill that gap. 
And federal district judges evaluating habeas petitions might look to 
empirical information about the state court that convicted the petitioner 
to calibrate their evaluations of whether that individual had a “full and 
fair” opportunity to litigate her claims in that forum.290  In particular, a 
habeas petitioner’s briefing might direct the federal judge to the literature 
on judicial elections, and to the fact that elected state judges tend to be 
“tough on crime” in the periods immediately preceding an election,291 
especially where crime has been the subject of television advertising for 
or against judicial candidates.292  A habeas petitioner who was convicted 
only a few months before an election, especially of a type of crime that 
received media coverage, would have a strong argument that the federal 
judge should view the validity of the state court’s adjudication with more 
skepticism than someone convicted shortly after an election or of a less 
sensationalized crime.  If the federal judge believed the state court’s 
decision to be swayed by the election cycle, that could be grounds for 
finding that the state court had made an “unreasonable application” of 
federal law,293 or that the habeas petitioner had not had a “full and fair” 
opportunity to litigate her claim—dramatically changing the scope of the 
 
 287. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817; see supra notes 128–130 and accompanying text.  
 288. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818. 
 289. Id. at 814. 
 290. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 469 (1976). 
 291. See supra notes 129, 130. 
 292. See supra note 182. 
 293. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text. 
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case.294  But current habeas doctrine also contains another important 
teaching for federal courts thinkers: because the U.S. Supreme Court after 
AEDPA has essentially been confined to statutory interpretation in 
determining the boundaries of federal habeas, jurisdictional arguments, 
especially those based on empirics, are far more productively directed to 
Congress than the Court.  Such arguments are needed: given that we know 
state courts are less willing to enforce bedrock criminal rights, revision of 
the habeas statutes to enable more expansive federal review should be an 
urgent priority. 
Third, the question of parity from the litigant perspective remains 
underdeveloped.  Normatively, we need multiple, context-specific 
definitions of quality advocacy which would in turn enable empirical 
assessment.  We need a fuller normative conversation about what makes 
courts constitutionally adequate from the litigant’s perspective to ensure 
that litigants’ interests in fair adjudication are met even if they do not win.  
Empirically, we need highly granular information such that litigants can 
compare, or at least understand, the particular courts in which their case 
might be heard rather than relying on data about the court systems as a 
whole.  Industry already provides some of this particularized information 
via big-data capabilities.295 
More broadly, federal courts scholars writing in doctrinal, theoretical, 
and historical modes must develop normative models for the adequacy of 
court systems—both comparative and singular—and the actors therein 
that can both make use of existing data and generate further factfinding.  
A few points of contention from the parity debate of the late twentieth 
century seem definitively to have been resolved by the data and methods 
that have been developed since.  Such facts can then ground new 
normative conversations.  For example, we now know that judicial 
selection processes make a difference.  Participants in the earlier parity 
debate argued about whether elected state judges were as independent as 
appointed federal judges; because we now know that the answer to that 
question is, on the whole, “no,” we can engage the debate taking place in 
the political science literature as to whether or not it is desirable for judges 
to be fully independent from the public.  We also know that, relative to 
the state courts, the federal courts are not overburdened.  Therefore, 
normative critiques of jurisdictional doctrine might focus not on whether 
classes of cases should be excluded from the federal courts due to system 
capacity alone; rather, we might think normatively about which kinds of 
 
 294. If the Stone Court had found that Mr. Powell had not had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate 
his claim in state court, his Fourth Amendment claim would have been back in the case, allowing him to 
exclude the murder weapon from evidence—a potentially transformative result. 428 U.S. at 468–71. 
 295. See, e.g., Free Report on Any Federal Judge or Opposing Counsel, THOMSON REUTERS, 
https://legal.thomsonreuters.com/en/c/free-litigation-analytics-report (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
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cases are best suited for the particular affordances of each court system 
and seek to resource each of these systems appropriately.296  And future 
writers on parity might think about how they can address their critiques 
not only to the U.S. Supreme Court but also to Congress, given Congress’ 
unique ability to shape jurisdiction based on factfinding about the courts. 
The data are, for the most part, available.  Scholars should use them to 
move both the literature and the courts themselves forward. 
The flourishing of data on the courts since the proclaimed end of the 
parity debate calls for the reconsideration of empirical questions 
embedded therein.  But the empirics also invite a reconceptualization of 
parity on new terms as a comparison of the characteristics and capacity of 
the state and federal courts.  This Article has untangled the earlier parity 
debate to bring the two literatures into conversation and to spark new 
comparative work.  Above all else, the important question is not which 
court system is “better,” but rather how both court systems can best be 
supported in their crucial work. 
 
 296. See Neuborne, supra note 16, at 803. 
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